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**„Проблеми на социалната и икономическата сигурност“**

**Том 2**

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**„PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE“  
AND THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEAN  
SECURITY WITH REFERENCE  
TO POPULATION HEALTH  
Biljana Bogdanović, Ratomir Antonović**

**Abstract:** The Partnership for Peace program was formulated as a concept of strengthening relations between NATO member states in the field of security. The starting point in the need to strengthen internal ties in order to successfully confront new social challenges, risks and threats. In the further course of the institution's activities, the countries of the former real socialism joined, especially from the former USSR. The project defined special relations with the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The European Union has promoted an indigenous concept of its own security, called the Foreign Security Policy with the Common Security and Defense Policy based on the Lisbon treaty. These NATO and EU programs as a whole are significantly coherent. Strategies showed numerous controversies and weaknesses which was especially manifested in the suppression of the pandemic coronavirus.



**Keywords:** Partnership for peace, NATO, European Union, Foreign security and defense policy, Lisbon treaty, population health, coronavirus pandemic

## **INTRODUCTION**

The decision of the United States, Canada and 10 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Great Britain) to join the peacetime defense alliance by signing the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, it was one of the most significant events in the period after the Second World War. In particular, for the United States, NATO membership represented a fundamental change in its foreign policy of refraining from „alliance interference“. The emerging East-West conflict provided a context for NATO's development. Until 1947, the United States and the Soviet Union clashed over: nuclear disarmament, the nature of post-war economic and political settlement in Central and Eastern Europe, Iran, and the form of peace treaties with the defeated Axis Powers.

NATO then inaugurated the Partnership for Peace Program at the Brussels Summit of the North Atlantic Council in January 1994. NATO leaders then announced that they would launch a direct and effective program, which would change the relationship between the countries participating in it and NATO, but also that the new program would go beyond dialogue and cooperation, in the direction of a true partnership – Partnership for Peace. Members of the North Atlantic Cooperation

Council and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe are invited to join the program. The program presupposes a semi-institutionalized framework for harmonizing the armed forces and military doctrines of Partnership for Peace members with NATO standards, as well as preparations for gradual accession to the Alliance, or as one of the stages in the development process of NATO expansion to the East. The Partnership for Peace is based on a twofold relationship - between NATO and each member state of the program and between the members themselves. Most of the member states of the Partnership for Peace are former communist countries from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but neutral countries - Austria, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden - also participate in it. The NATO pact and the Partnership for Peace, as international security organizations, have been limited in time to the last seven decades, since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed after World War II, in 1949.

Although the central motives of integration have been economic development and security, from the founding of the European Union until today, the idea of humanism has been highlighted as one of the starting values of an integrated Europe, which must not be forgotten and must be consistently implemented. Deciding on a common foreign and security policy of the European Union was made difficult every time a new member was admitted. As the number of stakeholders increased, it became more difficult to agree and reconcile interests. Therefore, the next necessary step was to reform the decision-making process in the direction of increasing efficiency, in order to finally and better present themselves to external participants, as united and well-organized, politically powerful, stable and functional. Today, the foreign policy of the European Union can be viewed as a result of all these events and communities that have emerged one after the other, changed and improved. The entire second half of the last century was spent in this upgrade, from which its present-day identity emerged. Although limited and flawed, it is the best landscaping system in Europe ever known. Its security and foreign policy are exactly what needs to be further improved and perfected.

The announcement of the pandemic of the new disease COVID-19 at the beginning of 2020 indicated a significant influence on economic events and trends, primarily through the possible emergence of economic recession that would by all indications be global and different from the previous ones, precisely because of an unusual factor that generates it. A pandemic can certainly be considered a negative exogenous shock whose effects spread through the economic system, causing an economic downturn and recession.

## **1. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE - CONCEPT AND FUNCTIONING**

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a program of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO. It allows partners to build an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their priorities for cooperation. Based on a commitment to democratic principles, the purpose of the Partnership for Peace is to increase stability, reduce threats to peace and build stronger security relations between NATO and non-Euro-Atlantic countries. The Partnership

for Peace was established in 1994 to enable participants to develop individual relations with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation, the level and pace of progress.

The activities offered under the Partnership for Peace program touch on virtually every field of NATO activity. Since April 2011, all Partnership for Peace activities and exercises have been open in principle to all NATO partners, whether from the Euro-Atlantic region, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative or global partners. There are currently 20 countries in the Partnership for Peace program.

With the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a huge security vacuum was created in Europe. Although optimism prevailed, the conflict in the former republics of SFR Yugoslavia and the possibility of other ethnic and religious conflicts in Eastern Europe, he pointed out that NATO itself was not surpassed (at least from the perspective of most Western countries, as well as the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe). Western countries did not immediately initiate the process of NATO enlargement to the east in response to these challenges, but sought various political dialogues and practical cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels, with the aim of strengthening trust and security. As early as 1990, at the summit in London, the Alliance sent an invitation to the governments of the countries of the former Eastern bloc to establish regular diplomatic relations and cooperation processes.

According to Novaković and Savković, NATO's commitment to this new type of relationship was confirmed at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen in June 1991, when the „Statement on Partnership with Central and Eastern European Countries“ was adopted, establishing military and broader ties between NATO and these countries. The next step was to create a new forum for multilateral security consultations between NATO and non-member European countries. Thus, in December 1991, at the NATO Summit in Rome, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established. <sup>1</sup>

The NACC met for the first time in December 1991, bringing together the then 16 NATO members and 8 Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Since March 1992, 11 more states of the former USSR and Albania have joined the Council. The Council functioned as a political forum for security consultations and co-operation among all the countries represented, managing to resolve many of the Cold War-era conflicts and bridge mistrust between former rivals. The council also served as a forum to discuss economic challenges, environmental protection, social protection and other issues. However, practical forms of military cooperation and the possibility of adapting that cooperation to the needs of each of the participating states were lacking. This shortcoming was answered in January 1994, when the Partnership for Peace program was launched.

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<sup>1</sup> Novakovic, I., Savković, M. Serbia and NATO - Partnership for Peace, Belgrade: Center for International and Security Affairs, 2019, p. 34.

NATO has invited all countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Conference on European Security and Cooperation (the predecessor of the OSCE) to join the emerging program. This new program established a framework for bilateral cooperation between each Partner country individually and NATO as a whole, which was primarily implemented through the Individual Partnership Program (IPP), which later became the Individual Partnership Program and Cooperation Program (IPCP), adapted to the circumstances and requirements of each of these countries. It is important to emphasize that a number of PfP countries were understood as a lobby of NATO, and the program provided a framework for the necessary institutional and military preparation for eventual full membership in the Alliance.<sup>1</sup>

Just six months after its launch, 22 members have participated in the Partnership for Peace program. The first PfP military exercise was held under the name Cooperative Bridge 94 in Poland in September 1994, as an exercise in joint participation in peacekeeping operations. security forum with partner countries, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which included all PfP countries, including Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. This created the basic architecture of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation between NATO and Partner countries: within the PfP, which is an operational bilateral program of cooperation between NATO and partner countries, and through the EAPC, which is a multilateral forum for regular dialogue and consultations on political and security issues.

Till today, 34 countries have responded to the invitation to join the PfP: Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Czech Republic, Finland, Georgia, Croatia, Estonia, Ireland, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia, Switzerland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. 13 of them have become NATO members so far, and it is certain that Northern Macedonia, and potentially Bosnia and Herzegovina, will join them in the near future.

The list of activities carried out through PfP has not been established; it is constantly changing, in line with new security challenges, as well as with the aspirations and needs of partner countries. After 1997, special relations were developed with Russia and Ukraine, which today take place through the NATO-Russia Council and the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

Activities or political-military norms of engagement in the program of the PfP partner country are defined primarily through two documents: the PfP Invitation and Framework Document. The set of activities chosen by the partner country is defined (presented) in its Presentation Document. The invitation document was adopted in January 1994 and launched the PfP. This document sets out the main objectives of the Partnership, establishes a Coordination Unit and invites all Partner countries to establish their NATO missions and participate in the work of those Alliance bodies

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<sup>1</sup> Novakovic, I., Savkovic, M., Ibid, 2019, p. 35.

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<sup>2</sup> Novakovic, I., Savkovic, M. Ibid, 2019, p. 35.

dealing with PfP issues. The Framework Document is an annex to the previous, invitation document and, in terms of its content, a kind of bilateral agreement between NATO and the PfP acceding country, by signing which it formally becomes a participant in this program. The Framework Document defines the following PfP objectives: transparency in the process of planning and financing the defense system, strengthening democratic control of the armed forces, maintaining the capacity and readiness to contribute to UN and / or OSCE operations, developing cooperative military relations for joint planning, training and exercises, long-term development of forces capable of joint action with the forces of NATO member states. In order to achieve these objectives, the Framework Document establishes mutual obligations and authorities between NATO and Partner countries, including the obligation of NATO to consult with a PfP participant if it assesses that its security is threatened. The text of the Framework Document cannot be changed, is not negotiable and represents a bilateral agreement, but it does not require ratification, so it has only political weight. Each partner country independently prepares a Presentation Document and presents in it the political objectives of its participation in the PfP, the steps it will take to achieve those objectives and the resources and resources it intends to make available for the activities under the program. This document represents a kind of „identity card“ of the country that joins the PfP and its individual political-military framework for the scope, intensity and content of cooperation with NATO. In addition, this is the only document whose skeleton is developed by the partner country independently, while all others are the result of bilateral and multi-lateral harmonization and agreements. It is in this document that the country joining the PfP defines whether it wants to become a member of NATO in the future. In addition, there are three basic agreements that, in terms of international law, create the conditions for the partner country to play an active role and smoothly implement a wide range of Partnership for Peace activities. These agreements are: Agreement between NATO and other Partnership for Peace member states on the status of their forces - PfP SOFA (defines the rights and obligations of members of NATO military forces and Partner countries in the territories of NATO member states and Partner countries. This allows for joint military exercises and training), the Agreement on Information Security (the so-called Security Agreement, which allows the exchange of confidential information, in accordance with the prescribed minimum standards of protection) and the Agreement on the status of missions and representatives of third countries to NATO (provides privileges and immunities to NATO headquarters - Belgium).<sup>3</sup>

The principles and manner of operation of NATO's civilian and military structure are fully reflected in PfP bodies. In addition to these basic bodies, there are about a hundred NATO committees that include PfP member countries in their activities. The meetings of these committees are mainly attended by members of state missions to NATO, while on certain occasions civilian and military experts from Partner countries attend the meetings. Also, Partner countries have the opportunity

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<sup>3</sup> Novakovic, I., Savkovic, M., Ibid, 2019, p. 38.

to be present at the strategic, operational and tactical level of work of the NATO command structure. The EAPC is the highest political body related to PfP and is the main forum mechanism for political coordination and oversight of all practical activities. Currently, the Council has 50 members (29 NATO member states and 21 Partner countries). The EAPC's activities focus on consultation and cooperation on a wide range of political and security issues, such as regional issues, arms control, international terrorism, peacekeeping operations, defense economics, civil defense planning, and scientific and environmental issues. The Council meets once a month, at the level of ambassadors (permanent representatives to NATO), at least once a year at the level of foreign and defense ministers, and occasionally at the level of heads of state and government. Other important bodies are the Political-Military Oversight Committee (in practical terms it implements NATO's partnership policy), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Military Committee (mostly the military body for multilateral dialogue between NATO and Partner countries), the Working Group of the Military Cooperation Committee (NATO Military Committee Advisory Body), Partnership Coordination Unit (responsible for coordinating joint military activities within the PfP and their evaluation), Political-Military Oversight Committee / ad hoc group for cooperation in peacekeeping operations (main forum within the EAPC for consultations on peacekeeping issues), Staff elements of the Partnership for Peace (a body consisting of officers from NATO member states and Partner countries working together to plan exercises and other forms of cooperation), the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (the body responsible for coordinating measures and procedures in response to emergencies in PfP participating countries).

The need to transform NATO in line with the Alliance's new identity and new security challenges has had a major impact on the adjustment of PfP activities and mechanisms. Such influence on the constant deepening of PfP mechanisms has had the partner countries, with the diversity of their aspirations and their interests. NATO and Partner countries have jointly developed a comprehensive matrix of mechanisms to support the practical implementation of concerted activities and translate common needs, interests and efforts into action. All the mechanisms of the Partnership that are available to the partners today have been established through the documents of the Partnership for Peace. According to Novakovic and Savkovic, the most important are the following<sup>4</sup>:

1. Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP) - Candidate countries for participation in PfP receive a detailed list of priorities and objectives of cooperation that are potentially available to them. They then decide on priorities and goals, on the basis of which specific activities are developed in which the partner countries will participate. Priorities and goals are defined at the biennial level in the Individual Partnership Program.

2. Planning and Review Process (PARP) - is a key instrument for both NATO and the PfP program, which aims to achieve sustainable development and enhance

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<sup>4</sup> Novakovic, I., Savkovic, M. Ibid, 2019, p. 42.

the capabilities of the armed forces, including interoperability. If they choose to participate in this process, and on the basis of a previously completed questionnaire used to determine the state of the defense system, the partner countries set goals, which respond primarily to their needs, but can also contribute, if they choose to do so, NATO-led crisis management operations.

3. Operational Capability Concept - Evaluation and Feedback (OCC) – If they have opted to implement PARP, countries implement the OCC program. The essence of the program is the evaluation of the reform process implemented within the PfP, ie PARP. This is one of the most important PfP programs as it serves to ensure interoperability between NATO and Partner countries.

4. Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations - a mechanism that allows PfP participants to participate in the planning and implementation of NATO-led operations, if previously accepted by the North Atlantic Council as partners in specific operation.

5. Education and Training Improvement Program – The purpose of this mechanism is to increase the capacity of education and training, in order to achieve interoperability with NATO in this area, and in order to respond to the current and future goals of the partnership.

6. On a case-by-case basis, Member States may invite partners to participate in exercises for crisis management missions involving all key Alliance institutions.

7. Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative (DCB) - the program introduced in 2014 involves providing additional support for national capacity building and includes a range of activities, from defense advisory assistance, to various training and education to defense sector reform and assistance in specific new areas such as cyber security.

8. Building Integrity Initiative - promotes the strengthening of transparency, good practices and integrity in order to reduce the risk of corruption, both in partner countries and in Alliance members.

9. For civil servants in the field of defense and security, a program for the development (capacity) of professionals may be launched within the PfP, with the aim of strengthening the capacity for democratic governance and oversight.

10. Partnership Trust Fund - is a mechanism aimed at providing financial support to partner countries to mitigate the practical consequences of the defense reform process.

11. Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) – a mechanism that is an improved form of institutional cooperation with NATO, which provides flexible assistance to interested partners in the field of reform and modernization of the security and defense sector. IPAP sets goals for which NATO provides advisory and practical assistance over a period of time. This mechanism is the highest form of cooperation with NATO for partner countries that do not have the ambition to become members - as is the case with Serbia. For those countries that show aspirations for membership, IPAP can be promoted through the so-called. Intensified Dialogue, which determines the program of reforms in the field of political, military, financial and

security issues.

12. Partnership Action Plan for the Building of Defense Institutions - the goal of the mechanism is the development of efficient defense institutions in the partner countries through the existence of full and functional democratic control. The establishment mechanism cooperates with other international organizations operating in the Euro-Atlantic area, such as the EU and the OSCE.

13. Education and training for defense system reform - a mechanism that improves the Education and Training Improvement Program, with a focus on education and training of professionals related to defense system reform.

Different Partner countries use different mechanisms available to them through Partnerships for Peace, which are functionally materialized in the forms of cooperation between Partner countries and NATO.

Obligations of PfP participating States The PfP acceding country undertakes certain political obligations such as the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights, adherence to the principles of international law, fulfillment of all obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international arms control agreements. , refraining from threatening or using force against other states, respecting existing borders and adhering to peaceful conflict resolution. The Framework Document commits NATO to cooperating and assisting a Partner State, in defined areas, as well as to consulting with any Partner State that faces, or considers to have faced, a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security. Based on the content of the Presentation Document, the Partner country and NATO agree on the IPCP, which is a set of selected activities.

Partner countries differ in the intensity and level of PfP engagement, as well as in their relationship with NATO. With respect to these criteria, and based on the rough geostrategic division of all PfP participating countries, the following division of types of partnerships is reached: <sup>5</sup>

1. Advanced PfP members: five traditionally neutral European countries, Switzerland and four EU members, Ireland, Sweden, Austria and Finland. Their participation in PfP is primarily reflected in active support and participation in peace-keeping operations and missions and cooperation aimed at a specific region that is of interest to NATO, ie PfP. Their contributions occasionally exceed even those of NATO countries.

2. Balkan states: due to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and then a series of internal challenges, the process of entry of the Balkan states into PfP was uneven. Countries that were out of the conflict, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, as well as Slovenia, joined the PfP in 1994, Northern Macedonia in 1995 (after the first interim agreement between this country and Greece on names and symbols), Croatia in 2000, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Montenegro and Serbia only in 2006. On the other hand, NATO and member states have launched a series of initiatives for this region, which we will discuss later in the text. Also, most countries in the region be-

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<sup>5</sup>Novakovic, I., Savkovic, M., Ibid, 2019, p. 46.

came full members of NATO: Bulgaria and Romania in 2004, Croatia and Albania in 2009, and finally Montenegro in 2017. Northern Macedonia is expected to join in 2019, leaving only Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in a position to define their co-operation with NATO through PfP.

3. Caucasus countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia): all three countries actively participate in PfP and have their own IPAP. Although all three countries have unresolved territorial issues (Armenia and Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh, Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia), NATO is trying to improve contacts with all three through „specially tailored“ cooperation programs. Armenia and Georgia actively participate or have participated in NATO-led peacekeeping missions and operations (KFOR in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan). Georgia openly demanded NATO membership, and in 2006 it was offered Intensified Dialogue and announced its intention to become a member in 2008. However, primarily due to the conflict with Russia, not all member states agreed on its accession, so it is still an active NATO-Georgia commission whose goal is to encourage further reforms and political dialogue between NATO and this country.

4. Central Asian States: The five Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are actively participating in PfP, and their participation is very important due to the critical security situation in Afghanistan since 2001. All countries have provided assistance to the ISAF mission in this country in various ways. In terms of partnership levels, only Kazakhstan developed IPAP in 2006, while cooperation with others is at a lower level.

5. Moldova and Belarus are two PfP member states that are in a kind of limbo between Russia and NATO. While Belarus' cooperation with NATO is at a fairly low level, and boils down to just a few mechanisms, cooperation with Moldova, which received its first IPAP in 2006, is quite developed.

6. Ukraine is the first of the post-Soviet states to join the PfP, and since gaining independence it has expressed clear aspirations for greater and deeper cooperation with NATO as well as for its contribution to overall security in Europe. In 1997, this country established a special partnership with NATO, within which the NATO-Ukraine Commission was established, which raised cooperation to a higher level. The Commission meets regularly at the level of ambassadors and military representatives, and occasionally at the level of foreign and defense ministers, as well as at the level of heads of state and government. Ukraine contributed to the NATO IFOR / SFOR missions in Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo, gave permission for NATO planes to fly over its territory for the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, and then initiated participation in the mission itself, and contributed to NATO's engagement in Iraq. The then Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma, stated in 2002 that Ukraine's ambition was NATO membership. However, only after the regime change in 2004-2005. A new step was taken in 2006, and Ukraine, like Georgia, began an Intensified Dialogue, with the aim of joining the Alliance in 2008 at the earliest. During a summit in Bucharest in April 2008, the heads of state and government of the Alliance member states agreed on Ukraine's future membership in NATO. Fol-

lowing the outbreak of the armed conflict in Georgia, this was postponed indefinitely. After Viktor Yanukovych came to power, Ukraine declared non-alignment as its commitment, but PfP activities continued at more or less the same high level. With the outbreak of the Maidan protests in 2014, Ukraine slowly turned again to the aspiration for NATO membership, while the Alliance itself confirmed that the prospect of enlargement exists. However, that is a little certain at this moment, although the cooperation between NATO and Ukraine has deepened since 2014, primarily due to the issue of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas.

The Partnership for Peace program is designed to help the participating countries restructure their armed forces and enable them to play an appropriate role in a democratic society, as well as to participate in peacekeeping missions led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Tailored to the individual needs of each country, it offers opportunities for practical cooperation in many different fields, giving participants the opportunity to choose as much - much or little - of the program and to the extent as their security needs dictate. Activities range from military exercises to seminars and training. Particular emphasis is placed on creating transparent armed forces that are subject to appropriate democratic oversight and control. The experience gained through the Partnership for Peace program has significantly contributed to cooperation between countries participating in peacekeeping operations such as the Stabilization Troops (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Force in Kosovo and Metohija (KFOR).

In 1995, NATO established the Mediterranean Dialogue with six countries - Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia - in the wider Mediterranean region. The program, which was joined by Algeria in 2000, aimed to create good relations and improve mutual understanding between the countries in the Mediterranean area, as well as to promote regional security and stability. Activities include inviting countries participating in the Dialogue to attend seminars at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, and the Defense College in Rome, Italy.

In 1997, NATO and Russia and NATO and Ukraine established bilateral cooperation on a more formal basis. Bilateral agreements have been signed between each of these countries and NATO to lay the groundwork for their future relations. The Permanent Joint Council of NATO and Russia and the Commission of NATO and Ukraine have been established as bodies that should enable regular consultations and discussions related to security issues. Topics discussed at the meetings of these bodies range from peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, crisis management and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to reorienting defense, protecting the environment and drawing up plans to protect civilians in emergencies.

During 2002, the Allies and Russia established deeper and closer relations by creating the Council of Russia and NATO, which replaced the Permanent Joint Council. It brought much more than a name change and set the relationship on a whole new footing. The new forum, in which all countries participate equally, is chaired by the NATO Secretary General. The key areas of co-operation have been identified: the fight against terrorism, crisis management and the prevention of the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, decisions made by the NATO-Russia Council are based on general agreement.

Since the early 1990s, a number of Eastern European countries have concluded that their security interests will be best protected by joining NATO and have formalized their intentions by applying for membership. Three former partner countries - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - became members in March 1999, increasing the number of member countries to 19. At the Alliance's summit in Prague in November 2002, seven more countries - Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia - are invited to start membership talks. They formally joined the Alliance in late March 2004.

The last seven new members, as well as others with aspirations to become members of NATO, have benefited to the maximum from the Action Plan for Admission of New Members, established in 1999 to help interested partner countries prepare for future membership. The Plan offers practical advice and assistance to potential members in achieving their goal. In return, aspiring members are expected to meet certain political goals, including the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for democratic procedures and the rule of law, and democratic control of their armed forces. Participation in the Plan does not offer any guarantees for future membership, but it does help countries adjust their armed forces and prepare for the obligations and responsibilities of Alliance membership.

The governments of NATO member states have made it clear that enlarging the Alliance is not an end in itself, but a further expansion of security under NATO auspices, making Europe as a whole more stable. The enlargement process helps prevent conflicts, as the prospects for membership themselves serve as an incentive for contenders to resolve their disputes with neighbors and to continue with reforms and the democratization process. In addition, the new members should not only enjoy the benefits of membership, but should also contribute to the overall security of all member states. In other words, they should be providers as well as security users.

With its different political position, NATO has shown its determination and readiness to react to security threats outside its own territory, if necessary by using military force. Peacekeeping operations, crisis management and humanitarian interventions are new forms of action, with a clear perspective of global impact on security processes.

According to Mutavdzic, NATO's responses to the new situation can be divided into three groups:

1. assistance provided to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the process of building liberal democratic systems,
2. cessation of war conflicts on the territory of the former SFRY (and the first use of military force outside the borders of its territory),
3. Undertaking peacekeeping operations of international military actions in order to ensure peace and stability in a broader security framework, according to its own procedures for the use of resources.

The political influence and activities undertaken by NATO in building the post-communist order of the states of Central and Eastern Europe were crucial for their choice of liberal democratic institutions and the economy of liberal capitalism in the process of transition. It was a successful interaction in building new national identities and interests of these countries and constituting a new NATO identity as the initiator and bearer of international socialization and implementation of new values. An important precondition was the democratic commitment of the new elites who experienced the bitter fruits of internal autocracy and a strict international hierarchy within the Eastern Bloc.

NATO's new mission in Europe was a parallel, interactive search, in which both NATO and the former communist states found the outlines of their new character, an identity that was constituted on the principles of a fundamentally different and redefined security policy - cooperative security. By transmitting the social knowledge of the established security community and promoting liberal democratic norms and institutions in those countries, NATO carried out a systematic practice of socialization, thus expanding the Euro-Atlantic community to the expanded space of „free“ Europe. An important feature of this approach was flexibility and adaptation to the specific needs of individual countries, which accelerated their rapprochement with the transatlantic community and future NATO membership.

Contrary to European integration processes and the determination to build unity on political co-operation and sharing common values, the Yugoslav crisis and the outbreak of war were a sobering „return of history“ from the turbulent Balkans, a hotbed of instability in Europe. Involved out of their own interests, NATO has been involved in the Yugoslav crisis from the beginning, and the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation (adopted at the summit on November 7-8, 1991) expressed deep concern over the crisis in the SFRY, which poses a serious threat to stability in the region. In particular, Article 5 emphasizes „that the recognition of the independence of those republics which so wish may be envisaged only within the framework of a comprehensive solution guaranteeing the protection of human rights and the protection of national minorities or ethnic groups“.<sup>6</sup>

Such an attitude presupposed a peaceful and long-term solution to the legacy of a state that lost its position as a buffer zone between the two blocs with the end of the Cold War and the basis of its independent foreign policy. After the unilateral appearance of Germany from the position of its interests in the region, the Yugoslav crisis was a good occasion for the United States to show its interest in this crisis area and use it to confirm its undisputed leadership position in Europe. Given that NATO was both earlier and later, it can be said, an organizational form of the American presence in Europe, with this attitude of its strongest force, NATO became more actively involved in resolving the crisis situation. In order to support the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions for resolving the Bosnian conflict, NATO bombed Bosnian Serb positions around Gorazde in April 1994, carrying out the first

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<sup>6</sup> Mutavdzic, R., Constitution of NATO identity after the Cold War, doctoral dissertation, Belgrade: Faculty of Political Science, 2016, str. 189.

military intervention outside its territory. By imposing peace in the war conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO has opened up opportunities for other types of military intervention outside its territory. The first subsequent action was the aggression against FR Yugoslavia, from March 24 to June 9, 1999, justified as a humanitarian intervention to protect the endangered Albanian population on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija by the military and police forces of FR Yugoslavia. But it was no longer an activity approved by the UN Security Council, which remained deeply divided on this issue, but a unilaterally initiated US intervention on which there was no unity in NATO, contrary to the founding act of the Alliance and the UN Charter.<sup>7</sup>

So, seen in a broader security context, the Yugoslav crisis was a good reason for NATO to reaffirm the reason for its existence and further reshape its post-Cold War mission, which, with an increasingly pronounced political component of dialogue and cooperation, does not neglect demonstrations of force and use of armed forces. The first three peace support operations were in that territory - in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. Operations in the Balkans have enabled NATO troops to gain extensive experience in peacekeeping and crisis management missions, as well as in leading multinational coalitions involving partners and countries outside NATO and the Partnership for Peace. This engagement strengthened ambitions to undertake peacekeeping operations outside the European area, in line with the belief reaffirmed at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Reykjavik, Iceland, in May 2002, that the need for long-term peace was global. „In order to undertake a range of missions, NATO must be able to mobilize forces that can be deployed very quickly to areas where they are needed, to support remote operations over time and to carry out tasks“ (NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 145), it was concluded at the ministerial meeting, and thus opened the possibility for NATO to deploy its forces outside the Euro-Atlantic area, in Afghanistan, since August 2003. Peacekeeping missions have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. They have become more complex, comprehensive and dangerous activities.

## **2. EU SECURITY POLICY AND POPULATION HEALTH**

The collapse of the Enlightenment myth of the unstoppable of historical progress in World War II was the true foundation of the European Union, in the sense that Europe understood, to put it simply, that it must achieve broader integrations to prevent such a cataclysm from recurring. borders. In that sense, the deepest root, and the meaning of European integration, is not of an economic nature at all, but life itself. Namely, the life of European nations was endangered, not only in the economic sense, but in its foundations, civilization, culture, way of life, the entire security structure of all the peoples of Europe, and therefore, in a deeper sense, this great trauma, the idea of civilization that everything should be done to prevent the recurrence of such traumas, has today become an imperative for the survival of the EU and further integration processes. All criticism of the European Union comes down to the fact that they have forgotten this deepest basis, and that is the security

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<sup>7</sup> Mutavdzic, R. Ibid, 2016, p. 192.

aspect, due to the excessive focus on the economic aspect, which we must admit is not possible without an aggressive and stable foreign, internal and integration security policy of all stakeholders. EU.

The 2004 and 2007 enlargements moved the European Union's borders further east and south and opened the question of regulating the EU's relations with its new neighbors. Stability and security are problematic in regions outside its borders, so the European Union wanted to avoid creating new dividing lines between itself and neighboring regions. For example, measures had to be taken to respond to new security threats such as illegal immigration, power outages, environmental degradation, organized cross-border crime and terrorism. That is why the EU has created a new European Neighborhood Policy that regulates relations with its neighbors in the east (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) and in the south (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, occupied Palestinian territory, Syria and Tunisia).<sup>8</sup> European citizens have the right to live in freedom, without fear of persecution or violence, anywhere in the European Union. However, international crime and terrorism are the problems that worry Europeans the most today. It is clear that freedom of movement must mean that every person, wherever he or she is in the EU, has the same level of protection and the same access to justice.

Through amendments to the treaties, the European Union is gradually becoming a single area of freedom, security and justice. The scope of EU action in these areas has expanded over the years as the European Council has adopted three successive framework programs: the Tampere Program (1999-2004), the Hague Program (2005-2009) and the Stockholm Program (2010-2014). While the Tampere Program and the Hague Program focused on strengthening security, the Stockholm Program is more focused on protecting the rights of citizens. Decision-making in these areas has become more effective thanks to the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009. Until then, member states retained full responsibility for creating and managing the area of freedom, security and justice. The work was performed mainly by the Council (through discussions and agreements of ministers from national governments), while the Commission and the Parliament had a small role. The Lisbon Treaty has changed that: the Council now makes most decisions by qualified majority, and Parliament is an equal partner in the decision-making process.

When it comes to the Union's external relations and international position, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe proposed a series of innovations that build on the EU reforms already achieved in previous stages (the Treaty of Nice). Apart from the institutional changes of the Union (voting method, number of commissioners, presidency, etc.), the biggest transformation of the EU refers to the area of the common security and defense policy, as one of the components of the common foreign policy of the Union. It can be said that after the adoption of the new agreement (Lisbon), the EU is no longer only a political and economic union, but also an important legal and security institution. In the first place, as already

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<sup>8</sup> Fonten, P., *Ibid*, p. 10.

mentioned, the European Union gained an explicit international subjectivity, ie it became a legal entity, which has not been the case so far (so far only the European Communities have had the status of a legal entity, as narrower components of the EU). While the previous European Union was based on a rather artificial division between the so-called “Common foreign and security policies” (the so-called second pillar of cooperation) and the EU’s external economic relations (the so-called “first pillar of cooperation”), ie into two different treaties, this division was largely abolished by the new treaty. All areas of the Union’s external relations, as well as issues of the common defense policy, have been formally brought under the same roof, ie in one chapter of the treaty.<sup>9</sup>

As already mentioned, innovations in the field of common security and defense policy are especially important. It can even be said that with the entry into force of the new EU reform treaty, one can speak of the existence of a common defense policy, based on the rule of law. Thus, a number of completely new provisions were included in the agreement, such as the clause on mutual assistance in the event of military aggression against one of the member states, the number of actions in peacekeeping operations was expanded, and then the so-called “Solidarity clause” among the members (for cases of terrorist attack or major accidents), the European Agency for Arms, Research and Military Capacities has been formed, the possibility of the so-called “Permanent structural cooperation” in defense issues between a small number of EU member states, etc. On the whole, it can be pointed out that the treaty represented a serious effort to transform the European Union into a real political community of countries that share a “common destiny” and to establish a much clearer and potentially more efficient, albeit very complex, structure for its citizens and the world. a kind of peacetime, democratic “empire.” In the field of external relations, the Union will in principle act much more consistently and clearly, and the range of its activities will be further expanded.<sup>10</sup>

The roots of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy can be traced back to the 1970s. Although this policy was characterized by ups and downs, it has been constantly upgraded to this day, so that, among other factors, it has become a pillar of cooperation between the member states of the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) specifically defined the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Greater competencies sublimate the essence of the changes that were planned and adopted by the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty (2007) also contains important innovations in the field of common security and defense policy. The first change is reflected in a different conceptual definition, so it is terminological in nature. The reason is the distance from the federal system of Europe. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has now been renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The common security and defense policy, as emphasized in the Lisbon Treaty, includes the gradu-

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<sup>9</sup> Lopandic, D., Ibid, p. 32.

<sup>10</sup> Bajagic, M., Institutionalization of Cooperative Security on the Example of the European Union, Belgrade: Security, vol. 55, No. 3, 2013, p. 21.

al establishment of a common defense policy of the European Union<sup>11</sup>.

All EU member states are engaged in the appropriate improvement of their own military capacities. At the same time, the Agency for the Development of Defense, Research and Arms Capacities (European Defense Agency) identifies operational needs, takes measures to meet them and contributes to their identification. Should the reasons arise, the European Defense Agency has the authority to implement all appropriate measures to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defense sector. The most important change in the field of the common security and defense policy is defined in Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty. It refers to the “mutual assistance” clause. The treaty explicitly states that, in the event of an attack on one member state, other member states of the European Union are obliged to provide assistance to the state over which the aggression was committed<sup>12</sup>. The agreement in this area elaborates in detail the topic of accession and cooperation of EU member states, as well as the potential of the EU in the field of: fight against terrorism, peacekeeping mission, conflict prevention and strengthening of international security, which is carried out outside the Union. Although this one forces, in cases of assistance to another Member State within the European Union, on the basis of a “mutual assistance clause”.

The part related to the so-called permanent structural cooperation of a number of member states of the European Union, in relation to defense policy issues, is defined as the most important change. The criteria for the application of the “mutual assistance clause” and for “permanent structural cooperation” are defined in advance. They refer to the military potential of the member states of the European Union. This type of cooperation is reserved and open to those member states that aspire to be part of the European military weapons program, as well as to make combat units ready for immediate action available to the Union. There is Title VII in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It contains changes which imply that each member state of the European Union is obliged to help other members, if they are affected by various natural disasters, caused either by human factors or natural disasters. This novelty in the Treaty, known as the “solidarity clause”, also implies the provision of assistance from one member state to another member state of the Union, in the event of a terrorist attack. The European Security Strategy also emphasizes the imperative of mutual solidarity. This brings to the fore what is essentially the basic goal of the European Union, in the field of common security.<sup>13</sup> The Treaty of Lisbon emphasized that again, which gave adequate importance and contribution to world security, as well as to building a safer world in which we all want to live. All these concepts are directly related to the issue of resolving the current refugee crisis, given the fact that it affects security, the declared and created

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<sup>11</sup> Djukanovic, D. Harmonization of the Western Balkans with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union - between normative, declarative and real, Belgrade: FPN Yearbook, 2014, p. 9.

<sup>12</sup> Bajagic, M. Ibid, p. 23.

<sup>13</sup> Djukanovic, D. Ibid, p. 12.

value system, and everything that is envisaged within the changes during the process of improving previous agreements.

On June 19, 1992, at a meeting in Bonn, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the Western European Union adopted the “Petersberg Declaration”, which determined the basic directions of WEU development, but also provided that military units be made available to it. composed of a wide array of conventional forces, in order to participate in military missions to be led by the WEU. The missions carried out by the Western European Union, better known as the Petersberg Tasks, are: humanitarian or rescue missions; peacekeeping missions; crisis management missions, including peacekeeping operations. The Amsterdam revision of the 1997 founding treaties continued to strengthen the building of the common foreign and security policy, primarily by “personalizing” it, establishing a legal basis for the operational development of European defense policy and changing policy towards the Western European Union by emphasizing its EU integration. It is institutionalized as a defense component of the Union. That defensive dimension of the European Union is limited to the so-called “Petersberg Tasks”. It is specified that the Common Foreign and Security Policy now includes all areas of foreign policy and security, including the gradual establishment of a common defense policy, which could lead to a common defense if the European Council so decides<sup>14</sup>.

The European Council was thus given the right to make a decision on the establishment of a common European defense, but with the condition that it be ratified in the parliaments of the member states, which emphasizes that this area still remains of intergovernmental character. Petersberg tasks are included in the Treaty on European Union as paragraph 2 of Article 17. According to this article, the Western European Union is an integral part of the development of the Union, providing it with operational capacity in accordance with paragraph 2. tasks). All members of the European Union, and those who are not members of the Western European Union, have the right to participate in these missions. The Treaty specifies that the Western European Union has the task of helping the Union, ie. supports it in defining CFSP issues related to defense, and therefore the Union will develop closer institutional relations with it, with a view to its possible integration into the EU, if the European Council so decides<sup>15</sup>.

At the initiative of France, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduces the function of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, who is also the Secretary General of the Council. Its role is to assist the Council in matters of this policy, in particular by contributing to the formulation and implementation of decisions, acting on behalf of the Council if necessary, and conducting political dialogue with third parties (the first High Representative was Javier Solana). In addition to the High Representative, the Council has the right, whenever it deems it necessary, to appoint an EU Special Representative who will have a mandate for a

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<sup>14</sup> Samardzic, S., *European Union as a Model of Supranational Community*, Belgrade: IES, 2009, p. 151.

<sup>15</sup> Samardzic, S., *Ibid*, p. 152.

specific political issue (which may relate to a specific country or region). The Special Representatives are accountable to the High Representative. The weaknesses of the CFSP became apparent as early as 1999 in the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija, in which NATO again played a key role. It turned out that the Western European Union does not have the capacity and cannot fulfill the role entrusted to it, so immediately after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Union changed its policy in connection with the engagement of this organization. What was entrusted to the Western European Union, the European Union has now decided to realize on its own. The Treaty of Nice transferred the operational competencies of the Western European Union to the European Union. All provisions on the “use” of the Western European Union in the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union in matters in the field of defense have been removed, and the Union has been left to develop its own capacities. Along with the Treaty of Nice, the Declaration on the European Security and Defense Policy was adopted, in which it is emphasized that “the goal of the European Union is for this policy to become operational as soon as possible”<sup>16</sup>.

Most of the novelties brought by the Treaty of Lisbon were related to strengthening the role of the European Union as an actor in international relations. With the abolition of the pillar structure, the Common Foreign and Security Policy became part of the wider area of the so-called the Union’s external action, which includes: the common commercial policy; cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid; restrictive measures; international agreements; EU relations with international organizations, third countries and EU delegations, and a common foreign and security policy. Only the Common Foreign and Security Treaty is regulated by the Treaty on European Union, and other areas of external activities by the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. This confirms that there is a significant difference between the powers of the Union, rules and procedures in this and other areas of external action.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy is still governed by Title V of the EU Treaty, which is supplemented by two new chapters “General Provisions on the Union’s External Action” and “Special Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy”. This second chapter is also divided into two parts: “Common Provisions” and “Common Security and Defense Policy”, which is thus separated into a separate legal entity. The most important institutional Lisbon novelties, whose goal was to ensure the consistency, effectiveness and consistency of the EU’s foreign policy, were the introduction of the President of the European Council, the reshaping of the High Representative and the establishment of the European External Action Service. In order to ensure unity in the Union’s foreign action and representation, the foreign policy functions of the Council and the Commission, ie the former High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, are now united in one function - the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The former High Representative for

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<sup>16</sup> Janjevic, M. Foreign Policy of the European Union, Belgrade: Official Gazette, 2007, p. 177.

the CFSP was also the Secretary-General of the Council, but following the Lisbon changes, the post of Secretary-General becomes separate and does not form part of the High Representative's position. The new High Representative now has a three-fold function: Vice-President of the European Commission, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and head of the European External Action Service. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is appointed by the European Council for a term of five years, acting by a qualified majority with the consent of the President of the European Commission.<sup>17</sup>

According to Article 18 of the EU Treaty, the High Representative "conducts the Common Foreign and Security Policy", and with his proposals contributes to its establishment and implements it as a mandator of the Council (including the area of the Common Security and Defense Policy). In addition, according to Articles 18 and 27 of the EU Treaty: he chairs the Foreign Affairs Council; as Vice-President of the European Commission, she takes care of the coherence of the Union's external activities (including international economic relations, and coordination and harmonization of the Union's actions within those policies that have important foreign policy elements such as international trade, development policy, etc.); represents the European Union in matters of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, conducts political dialogue with third countries on behalf of the Union and represents the Union's position in international organizations and at international conferences; manages the European External Action Service and EU delegations in third countries and international organizations.<sup>18</sup>

As a separate, autonomous body of the European Union, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was established. It was officially established by the decision of the Council on July 26, 2010. It is informally considered the Union's diplomatic service or foreign ministry. According to Article 27, paragraph 3 of the EU Treaty, it is composed of officials from the competent services of the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, and staff delegated by national diplomatic services. The European External Action Service consists of the central administration in Brussels and the Union's delegations in third countries and international organizations. Given that the European Union has diplomatic relations with almost all countries in the world, it is represented there by these delegations, which have a similar function as embassies. The Lisbon Treaty introduces decisions as the basic legal instrument in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This simplifies the Union's instruments in this area, because the previous joint strategies, common positions and joint actions are replaced by one instrument - the decision.

The two main security goals of the European Union's enlargement process are: strengthening its internal security and positioning the Union as a global security actor. Internal security means "individual and national security that is organized at the state level. These types of security are the foundation on which life is built

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<sup>17</sup> Lacic, D., *The Impact of European Union Enlargement on the Process of European Integration*, Belgrade: Faculty of Political Science, 2015, p. 317.

<sup>18</sup> Lacic, D., *Ibid*, p. 318.

without endangering. “Internal security is also the basis for the existence of international security.” Since the European Union is not a state but a specific community of 28 different states, it must offer, build and ensure to its citizens and members everything that implies individual and national security. Individual security refers to an individual of the European Union, while the content of national security from the aspect of the Union is difficult to determine, because the bearer of this type of security is the (national) state, and the EU is still only an alliance of states. National security is most generally defined as the security of the political people, and its content includes: security of national territory (including airspace and territorial waters), protection of human life and property, preservation and maintenance of national sovereignty and realization of basic social functions (socio-economic, social, political, cultural, environmental, economic and others). The Union must therefore ensure the content of national security, which applies to one Member State, at a higher and wider level for 28 different states.

The European Union’s internal security policies fall into four categories: the free movement of persons between EU Member States, from the right to work and settle to the abolition of border controls between Member States; fundamental rights for citizens of the European Union in other Member States, such as equality of economic, political and civil rights; immigration and asylum policies, which include cooperation in policies towards refugees and common policies towards third-country nationals; and as a fourth policy, police and judicial cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, terrorist activities, cross-border crime and illegal immigration. In a narrower sense, the internal security of the European Union will mean the issues that, according to the Lisbon reform of the founding treaties, constitute the “Space of Freedom, Security and Justice”.

Each enlargement of the Union required the intensification and new forms of cooperation in building the internal security of the Union. Thus, e.g. the certainty of enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has directed the Union to the problem of external border control. The old members of the Union emphasized that the candidate countries must have the means to secure their eastern borders, even at the cost of severing long-standing close ties between the candidate countries and their eastern neighbors. In May 2005, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States, called FRONTEX, became operational. The control of external borders was the responsibility of the member states, and this agency had the task of facilitating the implementation of community-related measures related to border management and thus ensuring integrated border management. With the Lisbon amendment of the founding treaties and the abolition of the pillar structure of the European Union, all the issues that until then in the integration process belonged to the so-called the third pillar became part of the wider area of “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, as the title of Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which now regulates this area. It includes policies on external border control, asylum, immigration, judicial co-operation in civil and criminal matters, and police co-operation. In

this way, the previously legally and technically divided matter from the domain of justice and internal affairs is grouped in one place.

On 22 November 2010, the European Commission adopted the European Internal Security Strategy, the first comprehensive document addressing the Union's internal security issues, and aims to enable existing policies to work together to address cross-border security challenges, risks, threats and to create an integrated approach. security, which deals equally with the causes and effects of insecurity. The strategy envisions the implementation of more than 40 measures in order to combat the main security threats in the European Union. It is an "umbrella" four-year mechanism for combating serious crime, organized and high-tech crime, all types of terrorism, and managing the Union's external borders and emergencies. The strategic areas that the EU will focus on in internal security are: suppression of international criminal networks, prevention of terrorism and response to radicalization and recruitment, increase of security of citizens and private sector in cyberspace, increase of security through border management and efficient emergency management. The main challenge for the internal security of the Union is crime, which is affected by all the achievements of the globalization process, such as high speed communication, high mobility and exchange of information, and above all, high-tech crime. Terrorism, in any form, remains a particular challenge facing the Union's internal security. Internal security is one of the goals of EU enlargement because it was a way for the Union to ensure the stability of its system from within, which is a basic condition for its successful action on the external plane. Crime and immigrants were just some of the problems that the Union has been facing on its eastern borders for decades, so the connection and integration of these so-called problematic countries in the EU system of rules was a way to permanently solve this problem. On the other hand, any enlargement, and in particular the Eastern Enlargement, was also a risk to the Union's internal security.

Only a politically united, stable and secure Union from within can be a global security player. The three main problems undermining the Union in achieving this goal lie in itself, its nature and character. First, it is a community of sovereign, independent nation-states that have historically had different foreign policies. A single European identity on the outside has yet to be built. Second, its security policy has been defined from the beginning as an area of intergovernmental cooperation and unanimous decision-making, unlike its economic policy, which is the opposite. The third and most important reason is the fact that the EU does not have its own army, and every world power bases the strength of its foreign policy on military power. It is questionable whether they will ever be able to have it, not because of the lack of financial or technical-technological capacities, but because the EU does not have that essential element - the European nation, that is, the European identity. The Maastricht Treaty introduced the notion of European citizenship, but for the army, as well as for the state after all, the basis of creation is the nation, the subjective relationship of belonging to that community.<sup>19</sup> The Union does not have that.

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<sup>19</sup> Samardzic, S., *Ibid*, p. 161.

For the citizens of the European Union, the most important topics that the European Union should take care of are climate protection, pandemics, health care, economic situation and social inequality. The direct consequence of the pandemic is an unprecedented decline in the economy. The focus of the EU's economic policy in the coming years will be a recovery fund worth 750 billion euros, which was financed for the first time by joint borrowing of the members of the Union.

From the beginning of the health crisis, and especially when it became clear that the EU is the epicenter spread of the virus, it was clear that there was no single response from Member States. That answer it was not unique in health measures to combat the infection, nor in the part that is refers to the economic measures of countries that have faced huge macroeconomics costs, as well as the great risks and uncertainties of economic and social developments in of the future.

One of the key unfavorable characteristics of economic trends, generated by the pandemic is the extremely high uncertainty and consequent risks that are economic, but also more importantly, of a medical nature. Therefore, at least the measures of economic policy, which the countries affected by the epidemic should be designed to reduce it uncertainty. Of course, well-known measures are available that primarily apply to help businesses, the financial sector and the population. However, given the specificity and atypicality of the recession, the effects of the measures taken are still uncertain.

## **CONCLUSION**

Despite the fact that the EU is intensifying its efforts to realize its own security and defense identity, some European countries see NATO as a key organization for their security. However, the question of the meaning of the organization's survival should not be ignored if the partnership becomes dysfunctional and inefficient. NATO is a military, but increasingly also a political organization, which gives assessments of the correctness of the democratic-political course of countries outside its borders. The survival of NATO and its future role will certainly be most influenced by the opinion of the United States on whether they want to maintain NATO, no matter what position the largest European member states have on the organization. Whether NATO will survive in the future is a factor of the moment, but it is certainly an evolution that is ahead. Cooperation within the Partnership for Peace is carried out at the level and speed determined by each partner country. The Partnership for Peace is based on cooperation and joint action of the defense system of sovereign states and does not have a clearly binding character in the international legal sense, but only the principles of voluntariness and self-determination are respected. The whole development path of the Partnership for Peace is characterized by initiatives and concrete measures to improve it and make it more operational. This program also served as a model for some other forms of NATO partnership cooperation, such as the Istanbul

Cooperation Initiative. Recently, the processes of unification of all existing cooperation programs have been intensified and the mechanisms developed under

the auspices of the Partnership for Peace are becoming open to other cooperation initiatives with partners. The main goal of the European integration process was and remains to organize Europe so that, on the one hand, it is the very area of peace, freedom, security and prosperity and, on the other hand, to be a global factor of global peace, freedom, security and prosperity. With the transformation of the EC into the European Union, and specifically with the Treaty on European Union, it was proclaimed that it wants to become a global political actor.

As the second of the five priority goals of the newly established European Union, it is determined to confirm its identity on the international scene by pursuing a common foreign and security policy, which includes gradually establishing a common defense policy, which could lead to common defense in the foreseeable future. Thus, the basic instrument for positioning the Union as a global political actor is a policy that has yet to be developed by the common foreign and security policy and, as its integral part, the common defense policy. Both policies required the harmonization and integration of the foreign policies and national defense of the member states, the most important issues of national sovereignty. It was possible to harmonize them, but to truly integrate them into politics with the prefix “European” has proven to be impossible until today.

The shock caused by the COVID-19 disease pandemic in the economy certainly showed that non-economic and non-financial factors can have very significant economic and financial effects both on the European Union and on a global level, and that they can appear as triggers for starting an economic recession. This will certainly contribute to paying much more attention to them future, both in economics and in conducting economic policy. Among these factors, which were previously dominated by political, in the form of political instability and possible war conflicts, the human health factor will certainly be added as one of the primary ones. Therefore, it is possible to assume that certain changes in the field of health care and public health will occur in the future, and that they also have significant economic consequences, both at the micro level (individuals and attitude), as well as at the macro level (state). Individuals and households will change their future structure of consumption, and a more significant part of savings can be expected to be directed to health needs. States that could reconsider theirs will behave similarly the current policy related to the provision of health care to the population.

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