

International thematic proceedings  
FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCHES

International thematic proceedings  
**FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCHES**

*Publisher*

**The Institut for Serbian Culture, Pristina – Leposavic**

*Co-publisher*

**International Association of Social Science Methodologists, Belgrade  
MB University, Belgrade**

*For the publisher*

**Professor Dragan Tancic, PhD, director  
Academician Professor Nedjo Danilovic, PhD, president  
Professor Milija Bogavac, PhD, founder and owner**

*Edited and prepared by*

**Academician, Professor Nedjo Danilovic, PhD  
MB University Belgrade**

**Professor Dragan Tancic, PhD  
Institute for Serbian Culture, Pristina – Leposavic**

*Reviewers*

**Academician professor Dževad Termiz, PhD  
University of Sarajevo, Faculty of Political Sciences, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Hercegovina  
Akademician Professor Wolfgang Rohrbach, PhD  
Regular member of the European Academy of Sciences and Humanities (AASA), in Salzburg  
Professor Alexander Halmi, PhD  
University of Zadar, Department for Tourism and Communication Sciences, Zadar, Croatia  
Professor emeritus Ljubiša Mitrović, PhD  
University of Nuš, Faculty of Philosophy  
Prof. dr Venelin Terzijev  
Ministry of Culture Republic of Bulgaria, Sofia**

*Proofreading*

**Jelena Vojinović Kostić**

*Technical preparation and graphic design of the text*

**Miodrag Panić**

*The press*

**GID „Pi-press“, Pirot**

*Circulation*

**150**

**ISBN 978-86-89025-86-6**

The holding of the international thematic scientific conference and the publication of this Proceedings were organizationally and financially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, Academy of Sciences and Arts of Serbian, Institute for Serbian Culture from Pristina - Leposavic and MB University from Belgrade.



ИНСТИТУТ ЗА СРПСКУ КУЛТУРУ ПРИШТИНА – ЛЕПОСАВИЋ  
INSTITUTE FOR SERBIAN CULTURE PRISHTINA – LEPOSAVIĆ



The Institute for Serbian Culture, Priština – Leposavić

International Association of Methodologists of Social Sciences, Belgrade

The MB University, Belgrade

International thematic proceedings  
**FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCHES**

Leposavić, 2023.

## CONTENT

Begrüßungsrede des Akademikers Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Rohrbach, Mitglied der Europäischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste aus Salzburg .....	9–10
FOREWORD .....	11
INTRODUCTION .....	17
 1. <b>Dragan Lj. Tančić</b> <b>Vanda B. Božić</b> BASIC RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE IN SPORTS FROM THE ASPECT OF METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND CRIMINAL-LEGAL SCIENCES .....	         21
2. <b>Ljubiša R. Mitrović</b> THE POSITION OF SOCIAL AND HUMANISTIC SCIENCES AND THEIR ROLE IN DEVELOPING CRITICAL AWARENESS AND BUILDING ALTERNATIVE PROJECTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE (Marginalia on the importance of fundamental and transdisciplinary research and deontology of the profession of a scientist) .....	         41
3. <b>Nedo S. Danilović</b> FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH ON WAR AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE PROGRESS OF GLOBAL COMMUNITY AND PROSPEROUS DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN COUNTRIES .....	         61
4. <b>Dževad R. Termiz</b> SPECIFICITY OF MODELING THE SUBJECT OF JOURNALISM SCIENCE RESEARCH AS A RESULT OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH .....	         91
5. <b>Aleksandar A. Halmi</b> SOCIOCYBERNETIC AND CHAOS THEORY: A NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH .....	         103
6. <b>Boris Đ. Krivokapić</b> FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH IN THE SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW .....	         117

7. **Nevad H. Kahteran**  
 PROMOTING COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY AS A GENERAL  
 CROSS-TRADITION ENGAGING WAY OF DOING PHILOSOPHY  
 TOWARD WORLD PHILOSOPHY ..... 153
8. **Dušan B. Regodić**  
**Damir D. Jerković**  
 MODELING AND SIMULATION OF DYNAMIC SYSTEMS  
 IN THE FUNCTION OF BASIC RESEARCH IN TECHNICAL  
 AND TECHNOLOGICAL SCIENCES ..... 171
9. **Wolfgang R. Rohrbach**  
 BEDROHUNG DER MENSCHHEIT DURCH VIER  
 MEGA-SCHOCKWELLEN ..... 205
10. **Venelin Terziev Krastev**  
 СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ В УСЛОВИЯХ  
 ГЛОБАЛЬНОГО КРИЗИСА ..... 221
11. **Vojislav R. Babić**  
**Siniša Đ. Zarić**  
 THE ESSENCE OF FACTOR ANALYSIS AND ITS  
 APPLICATION IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES ..... 229
12. **Artur Gennadievich Bezverkhov**  
**Svetlana Vyacheslavovna Elekina**  
 LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE ..... 245
13. **Milosav V. Milosavljević**  
 PERSPECTIVES OF BASIC RESEARCH ..... 255
14. **Momčilo J. Sakan**  
 THE SCIENTIFIC ROLE OF HYPOTHESIS  
 IN FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH ..... 269
15. **Ivan B. Petrović**  
**Miodrag L. Gordić**  
 EVALUATION OF CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF WEAPONS  
 SYSTEM USING TRIANGULAR INTERVAL TYPE-2 FUZZY SETS  
 IN PROCESS OF MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION MAKING ..... 285
16. **Srdan V. Starčević**  
**Srdan M. Blagojević**  
 FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH IN SOCIAL SCIENCES  
 AND PUBLIC INTEREST ..... 297
17. **Nataša N. Stanojević**  
 THE CONTEMPORARY PROCESSES IN THE GLOBAL  
 ECONOMY AND METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES ..... 307

18. Olja M. Arsenijević Nenad N. Perić INTERDISCIPLINARYNESS AND DIFFERENT APPROACHES OF CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS .....	319
19. Ermin H. Kuka DESIGN OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH OF PUBLIC POLICY AS A RESULT OF FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH IN THE METHODOLOGY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE .....	333
20. Detlev H. Baumgarten NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CARE SECTOR NURSING ROBOTS AND THEIR USE IN THE PATIENT ENVIRONMENT .....	347
21. Marko M. Parezanović ПРИМЕНЕНИЕ АНАЛИЗА СОДЕРЖАНИЯ ДОКУМЕНТА В ИССЛЕДОВАНИИ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ ПЕРЕВОРОТ .....	363
22. Dragana J. Janjić Goran M. Janićijević CONTEXTUALIZATION OF MEDIEVAL MONUMENTS OF CULTURE AS A METHODOLOGICAL STARTING POINT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR INTERPRETATION ON SELECTED EXAMPLES FROM KOSOVO AND METOHIIJA .....	379
23. Gerhard Wilfinger LIVING STANDARD AND QUALITY OF LIFE IN URBAN .....	407
24. Milivoje G. Pajović FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH AS A STARTING POINT APPLIED AND OTHER RESEARCH .....	421
25. Goran M. Džafić Aleksandar M. Damnjanović FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH OF NETWORK COMMUNICATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA .....	433
26. Vesna S. Zarković THE SERBIAN ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SUFFERING OF SERBS IN KOSOVO AND METOHIIJA AT THE END OF THE 19TH AND THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY .....	451
27. Ena S. Mirković KOSOVO AND METOHIA IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER BLAGOJE NEŠKOVIĆ (1945–1952) AS AN EXAMPLE OF METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL SOURCES .....	471

28. **Jovan D. Simijanović**  
TREPČA IN THE ECONOMY OF YUGOSLAVIA(1927–1956) ..... 485
29. **Ivana Ž. Ivanovik**  
THE IMPORTANCE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROJECTS  
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN COUNTRIES ..... 505
30. **Gordan B. Bojković**  
SERBIAN MEDIEVAL STUDIES ABOUT KOSOVO  
AND METOHIA, THE PREVIOUS THIRTY YEARS ..... 513
31. **Vlado N. Radić**  
**Nikola V. Radić**  
IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON ENERGY SECURITY  
AND AVAILABILITY OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS ..... 525
32. **Nikola P. Jović**  
**Katarina Bogičević**  
**Andrej Naumović**  
CITIZENS' PERCEPTION OF SERBIA'S FOREIGN POLICY  
THROUGH THE PRISM OF CULTURAL AFFILIATION  
TO THE EAST/WEST ..... 549
33. **Jovan M. Gordić**  
**Predrag M. Gordić**  
IMPLEMENTATION OF METHODS, TECHNIQUES AND  
INSTRUMENTS IN FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH OF LAW ..... 563
34. **Teodora G. Deljanin**  
THE ASSOCIATION OF LOW SOCIAL STANDARD OF THE  
FAMILY AND FAMILY PARTICIPATION IN THE LIFE OF  
ADOLESCENTS WHO USE PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES ..... 577
35. **Alojz A. Riegler**  
THE GREEN CITY – PREVENTING OVERHEATING  
NATURALLY ..... 593
36. **Petar R. Ristanović**  
HISTORY AND/OR PROPAGANDA: THE BOOKS BY  
TIM JUDAH, NOEL MALCOLM AND MIRANDA VICKERS  
ON KOSOVO AND METOHIA ..... 609

*Vesna S. ZARKOVIĆ\**

Institute for Serbian Culture Priština – Leposavić

## THE SERBIAN ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SUFFERING OF SERBS IN KOSOVO AND METOHİJA AT THE END OF THE 19TH AND THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY\*\*

*Abstract:* In the paper, the author speaks about the suffering of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija in the period from the Berlin Congress to the Balkan Wars in the context of solving the Serbian issue. The difficult position of the Serbian people imposed itself as a primary task in the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Serbia. Complex diplomatic relations influenced the Government in Belgrade to consider several ways to resolve the Serbian issue within the framework of the Eastern issue. In addition to the Ottoman authorities, the obstacles in the implementation of the plans were represented by the Albanians, but also by the interests of certain great powers, primarily Austria-Hungary. The realization of imagined ideas about the protection of the Serbian people in Old and Southern Serbia gave short-term results, but they contributed to the final liberation from Ottoman rule.

*Key words:* Serbs, Albanians, Kosovo and Metohija, Serbian issue, violence.

The liberation wars of 1876–1878 represented a turning point in solving the Serbian question as a segment within the Eastern issue. The Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija were worried about their fate, especially in 1877 when the Turkish army massively passed through Kosovo and committed various crimes, looting everything in front of them and boasting that they would reach Belgrade. This behavior of the Turkish soldiers instilled even more insecurity and fear among the Serbian population, which was waiting for the results of the battle and was delighted to receive the news of the success of the Serbian army. The Serbian army, with the help of Russia, liberated Kuršumlja, Prokuplje, Niš, Leskovac, Vranje and Gnjilane. Faced with the advance of the Serbian army,

---

\* Senior research associate, vesna.zarkovic07@gmail.com

\*\* This paper was written as part of the scientific research work of NIO under the Contract concluded with the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development Republic of Serbia, number: 451-03-47/2023-01/ 200020, date 03.02.2023.



the *bashibozu* soldiers in Kosovo threw down their weapons and fled from the locals. In these wars, the Serbian army, led by Major Radomir Putnik, liberated Gnjilane, and one of its advance units, under the command of Lieutenant Miloš Sandić, reached Gračanica in January 1878 (Popović 2007: 50). The success achieved by the Serbian soldiers was short-lived. After the withdrawal of the Serbian army from Lužan and Gračanica, the Turks began to take revenge on the Serbs for the fear and humiliation they suffered. Together with the *bashibozuks*, they attacked Serbian homes in Priština and in the villages. They killed people in their in houses and robbed movable property. Serbian peasants looked for salvation in the forests, and in the cities they moved from one yard to another. There was a recorded case of the death of Serbian young men who died while running away from the *bashibozuks*. Thirteen young men were first shot, and then, wounded in this way, they were ferociously dragged into a courtyard, where the *bashibozuks* shot at them again. Out of the thirteen, only one survived, pretending to be dead. On the same day, ten more prominent Serbian citizens were killed in Priština. The time that followed was marked by Turkish revenge against the Serbs, who were not allowed to leave their houses and bury the murdered according to Orthodox custom. The municipal authorities visited Serbian homes, collected the murdered, took them away in garbage trucks and buried them in the cemetery, near the church (Popović 2007: 230–232).

The Serbian-Turkish war caused major demographic disturbances not only in the areas liberated by the Serbian army, but also in those areas that were in the rear of the front on the Turkish side. The movement of the Christian population occurred a little earlier, in 1875, when under the pressure of the *bashibozuks* Circassians and Albanians, supported by the Turkish authorities, they moved *en masse* to Serbia. According to certain data, it is assumed that there were about 200,000 of them. The successes of the Serbian army in 1877 and 1878 led to the emigration of Turks, Albanians and Circassians, whose places were replaced by Serbs from various regions, primarily from the border districts of Aleksinac, Kruševac and Knjaževac (Bogdanović 1985: 137; Stojančević 1998: 173–177). However, the Albanian population began to settle in the border areas of the Ottoman Empire in large numbers in Malo Kosovo and Gornja Morava, but also in Kriva Reka and the areas around Ibarski Kolašin. The liberation wars had great consequences not only on the further development of Serbia, but also on the vision of its liberation aspirations for the unification of all Turkish regions inhabited by the Serbian population. The results achieved by Serbia in the war were called into question by the signing of the treaty between Russia and Turkey on February 19, 1878 in San Stefan. At that time, a good part of the liberated areas was assigned to Bulgaria. At the beginning of that year, on January 3 to be exact, Serbia sent a request to the Russian emperor „to include the independence of Serbia and the annexation of Old Serbia or the current Kosovo *vilayet* with the addition of Vidin to the preliminaries of peace as well as the terms of the armistice“. Despite this request, according to the Russian-Turkish agreement, the borders of San Stefan Bulgaria included Niš and all of Ponišavlje,

all of South and Upper Morava, and all of Macedonia, including a good part of Albania in the south. In addition to independence, Serbia received part of the territory in the northern parts of Kosovo, Stari Kolašin and Malo Kosovo with Vučitrn and Podujevo. This agreement provided for the Serbian army to leave the areas of Gornja Morava, Izornik and Kriva Reka, populated by Serbs, and in return to receive territory in the Lapland region, where the majority were Albanians with only a small number of Serbian peasants (Bogdanović 1985: 139–140). After such decisions and divisions, in the same year, the San Stefan Treaty was revised in Berlin, where the Serbs had to fight for the recognition of what they had *de facto* conquered.

At the congress in Berlin, Turkey presented its proposal, which stipulated that Vučitrn, Kuršumlja, Prokuplje and Leskovac remain within its borders, and in case of non-acceptance, the border should be at Grdelica (Serbia 1878. Documents 1978: 457–458, no. 272). The Turkish delegation justified its views and proposals by pressure from Albanian tribal elders, and it energetically demanded from the British delegate Salisbury „to prevent the expansion of Serbia and Montenegro into Albanian territory“. This attitude of the Turkish delegation was also supported by the fact that the Albanian elders sent a petition directed against Serbia right before the start of the Congress. The news that the Albanians were ready to defend their interests even with weapons contributed to this (Serbia 1878. Documents 1978: 467–468, No. 280).

The Serbs, unlike the Turkish side, referred to ethnographic and historical facts, which Jovan Ristić explained to Count Andrašić, the representative of Austria. Ristić indicated the cause and course of emigration of the Serbian population and the manner in which the Albanians settled and particularly emphasized: „They are not in the majority, they are newcomers. Not every enclave can be a state by itself.“ Furthermore, he placed a special emphasis on the atrocities against the Serbs, committed by the Albanians, especially in those areas from which the Serbian army had to withdraw. The resulting situation called into question the survival of the Serbs „under Turkish rule and angry Arnauts, who have no law, no soul, no heart“ (Serbia 1878. Documents 1978: 324–325, No. 186; Богдановић 1985: 140).

The Committee for the Liberation of Old Serbia and Macedonia, which was founded in Kosovo in 1877, also took part in the Berlin Congress. The President of the Committee, Sava Dečanac, signed a memorandum, which, among other things, states: „When the Almighty God in his mercy placed in your hands the fate of those people enslaved for many centuries, on an otherwise classic land, and when the great European powers accepted the noble task of improving the fate of the unfortunate population of this part of Europe, be in this sublime moment the fathers and benefactors of the forgotten people of Old Serbia. This nation has suffered untold sufferings to this day, because it was left at the mercy of the Turkish and Arban renegades. Now that the position of all the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula has improved, is it right that we remain in the chains of heavy tyranny, is it right that the Turks continue to slaughter us and the Arbanians

burn our homes, is it fair that we continue to be subjected to the actions that are worse than the treatment of livestock in Europe. Since we have participated in the war of liberation, since we have rebelled against exploitation, since we have expressed our desires for freedom and union with our brothers, if the old order is restored, Muslim fanaticism will be boundless, with even more severe violence, and will lead us to we suffer more than before. If he can't provide us with freedom, let him at least provide us with some autonomy and personal security" (Serbia 1878. Documents 1978: 502–503, No. 301).

The demands of the Serbian government and the engagement of its representatives at the Berlin Congress were not resolved in accordance with the expectations of the Serbs. Serbia gained independence and territorial expansion to four districts, liberated in the war. However, a part of the Serbian population still remained outside the country's borders, living in difficult conditions that worsened more and more. Independent Serbia, faced with the decisions of the Berlin Congress, directed its forces towards the south, i.e. towards the Serbs who still lived in the Ottoman Empire. In the period that followed, the Serbian population was exposed to attacks first of all by Albanians, and then by *muhajirs*, who came from areas that previously belonged to the Ottoman Empire, whose authorities were not interested in restoring order and preventing further violence. The reason for such behavior lies in the fact that the Serbs were designated as the main culprits for the failure of the war, because of which Russia allegedly declared war on Turkey. Members of the Turkish army and government often showed solidarity with the Albanian oppressors, as evidenced by the fact that on February 22, 1882, on the day Serbia was declared a kingdom, a Military court was established in Priština. Thanks to the work of this court, a large number of prominent Serbs, primarily teachers, priests and other influential people, signatories of many petitions for the Congress of Berlin, were sentenced to long-term prison terms, ranging from 6 to 101 years. Executioners (*urfies*) of the infamous Ibrahim Pasha slaughtered 7,000 people without trial. The president of the court Ibrahim Pasha himself sentenced to death even a Serbian name (History of the Serbian People VI/1, 1983: 293). Many convicts left their lives in distant Asia Minor and the Thessaloniki dungeons, and some of the survivors were pardoned only in 1888, with the mediation of Russian and British diplomacy (Kosovo and Metohija in Serbian History 1989: 227).

The suffering of the Serbian population and the daily violence against them forced the Government in Belgrade to seriously consider the issue of the position of their compatriots in the Ottoman Empire. The Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jovan Ristić, intended to push Turkey to sign more international agreements. The main task was to negotiate a convention between Serbia and Turkey. The first Serbian representative in Constantinople, Filip Hristić, already in 1879 started talks with the Turkish side about the conclusion of the Serbian-Turkish consular convention. After him, other Serbian delegates also worked on this task, which lasted a full seventeen years. The work and negotiations with the Turkish side were by no means easy and simple, because Porta

always found new reasons and delayed the implementation of what had already been agreed. First, a temporary and then a permanent consular convention was signed. Solving the Serbian question and preventing the violence to which the Serbs were exposed in the Ottoman Empire was imposed as a priority for the Government in Belgrade. That is why, first in 1885, a plan was drawn up for organized educational and cultural work among the Serbian and in general among the Slavic population in Old Serbia and Macedonia, which meant that in addition to teachers, priests and national workers, Serbian consuls would be in charge of managing such tasks. It was a long-term plan for Serbia, so in October 1886, Stojan Novaković, one of the best connoisseurs of the situation in the Ottoman Empire, was sent to the post of deputy in Constantinople. His task was to organize a whole network of legal Serbian educational and cultural institutions, for example schools, churches, libraries with Serbian teachers, priests and national workers. As a priority in Novaković's work, the question of opening a consulate arose, which was also agreed upon by a temporary convention. The intention was that over time the consulates would strengthen their role and that due to the disturbances that were expected from the Turkish side, appropriate legal acts would be passed to regulate their position. The idea could only be implemented by signing a permanent consular convention, which Novaković continued to insist on (Vojvodić 2007: 112, 120). Thanks to the hard work, experience and skill of Stojan Novaković, Serbia opened its consulates based on a temporary consular convention, first in 1887 in Thessaloniki and Skopje, and two years later in Bitola and Priština (History of the Serbian People VI/1, 1983: 277).

In Kosovo and Metohija, especially in Priština, the opening of Serbian consulates, which were seen as the presence of Serbia, was followed with special attention. Immediately after taking office, the consul saw the real situation on the ground, and his primary task was to receive daily complaints from Serbs. The engagement of the consul on these issues and the regular sending of reports on the situation in the area of the Priština consulate had a negative impact on the Albanians, but also on the local Turkish authorities. Only one year after the opening of the consulate in Priština, the first Serbian consul, Luka Marinković, was killed (Zarković 2018: 374). If you look at the tragic fate of the murdered consul, you can imagine what happened to an ordinary Serb in the city, and especially in the villages.

And indeed, the years that followed confirm our opinion. The Greek-Turkish conflict in 1897 and the behavior of the Albanians, dissatisfied with the outcome, who were armed to the teeth and vented their anger on the innocent Serbs, had a negative impact on the position of the Serbian population. Anarchy reigned in Kosovo *vilayet* because the Turkish army was sent to the south due to the conflict with Greece. Thus, in February of the same year, the army from Kumanovo, Prizren, Skopje, Gostivar, Mitrovica and Priština, and then from Preševo and Tetovo, first moved towards Thessaloniki. The relocation of the army contributed to the reduction of the number of soldiers in Old

Serbia, the weakening of the garrison in the Kosovo *vilayet* and new personnel solutions. This was followed by the enrollment of Albanians, ready to go to war, who demanded from the sultan to arm themselves. Many of them had high expectations, such as getting some ranks and being appointed as elders that would bring them complete freedom. However, their wishes did not come true, and members of the regular army were appointed as elders, which caused the Albanians to go back, keeping their weapons and military equipment. Upon their return, they plundered everything in front of them and kept the loot for themselves, committing violence against the Christian population. From the very beginning, the mobilization of the Turkish army caused too much concern among the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, whose fear was justified, especially after learning that the permanent staff had been replaced by a reserve. The members of the reserve army were without any supervision, and as such they committed various incidents. The conditions for establishing order among the reserve army did not exist, and atrocities in the cities were committed by almost everyone, from officers to ordinary soldiers. The bad mood also came from the Turkish authorities, who very often called into the reserve squad, as well as because of the conflict with the rebel Albanians. In addition, dissatisfaction was expressed „against the emperor who sells them to the occupied people, spends the people's church money or does not take enough care of the Islamic population“ (Zarković 2014: 130-132). During the whole of 1897, violence was perpetrated against the Serbian population in the entire Kosovo province, about which there are numerous reports from the consuls of the Kingdom of Serbia from Priština and Skopje (Peruničić 1985: 251–300). In addition to Serbs, insecurity and fear were also present among representatives of foreign countries who served in those regions. The Government of the Kingdom of Serbia was trying to get a reaction from the Porte and the Turkish authorities to take certain measures to protect the Serbian population. After numerous interventions in Constantinople, the action of the Turkish authorities followed in the autumn of the same year, but it did not bring concrete results. On the contrary, the leniency of the Turkish authorities towards the Albanians was obvious and led to new mutual conflicts that resulted in the expulsion of the *mutasarif*s from Priština, Prizren and Sjenica. This time, the central Turkish authorities again did not respond adequately to this behavior of the Albanian rioters and their mutual conflicts, which had a negative impact on the life of the Serbian population. Instead of working to calm the situation, prevent new conflicts, and deal with the disruptive factor, they indulged the Albanians more and more, and often showered them with various gifts. The results of such a policy were also visible in a conflict in Djakovica between two Albanian champions, Riza Beg and Bajram Cur, which affected almost the whole of Metohija. The situation between them culminated, which influenced the Porte to send a commission from Constantinople and negotiate with Riza Beg (Jagodić 2009: 50).

Murders and violence against Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija became daily occurrences that influenced Stojan Novaković to establish a special commission

at the Porte that would establish, investigate and list crimes in the Kosovo *vilayet*. He sent two notes to the Turkish government, the first in May and the second in July 1898, in which he highlighted all the dangers that threatened to destroy the Serbs in those regions. In addition, he drew attention to the events and riots that took place every day on the Serbian-Turkish border. Along with the notes, there was also an addendum about numerous Albanian violence in recent times. Porta, thanks to Novaković's involvement, sent a commission to investigate in early August. General Saadedin Pasha was at the head of the commission that spent fifteen days in Priština and other parts of Kosovo and Metohija. During that time, they did not conduct any investigation, and instead of interrogating the accused, they met with the main Albanian perpetrators, known for a large number of crimes against Serbs (Vojvodić 2007a: 266–267).

The work of the commission was unsuccessful, and its action contributed to Novaković sending to the Government in Belgrade a proposal to address the signatory powers of the Berlin Congress, in order to be convinced of the truth of Serbian claims about the situation in the Kosovo Province, and further, as he said, to prevent: 'evil, directed with premeditation against the Christian there indigenous people'. It was obvious to Novaković that the Porte and the Sultan were not ready to seriously consider and prevent violence against the Serbian population. That is why, before sending the proposal to Belgrade, he drew up an action plan for the Serbian Government, based on which Constantinople was to be asked to form an impartial commission to investigate crimes in Old Serbia, which would be joined by a Serbian delegate (Vojvodić 2007a: 267, 270–272). On October 31, the Serbian delegate, with the approval of the Government, submitted a new note to the Porte in which he even more vigorously demanded the formation of a mixed commission that would carry out its work impartially. At the same time, he often talked with Russian and Austro-Hungarian deputies in Constantinople, who supported the idea of an impartial commission and believed that violence against Serbs was not only an internal issue of Turkey.

That period in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija was marked by numerous sufferings of the Serbian population that led to emigration, which is evidenced by the fact that at that time 116 families with 500 members fled across the border to Serbia and found refuge in Kuršumljija. This, as well as other data in the previous ten years, indicated the poor position and emigration of Serbs and influenced Stojan Novaković to draw the attention of the Government in Belgrade and request information about atrocities. His plan was to, based on the facts, ask the Porte to take certain measures and protect the Serbian population from further suffering. In addition, he demanded from the Government to inform not only Serbian, but also foreign press about the situation. Such a Novaković's proposal was approved by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, who sent a proposal to the delegates in Paris and Petrograd to publish information in the press. Porta understood the articles about the suffering of Serbs in the domestic and foreign press as a hostile attitude. The published texts caused an indignation in Constantinople, so all correspondents

of foreign newspapers denied the writing of the press in Serbia, as well as the data on emigration (Zarković 2015: 88–89).

The denial of the Porta and its representatives in the local government about the situation in which the Serbs found themselves contributed to the deterioration of the situation on the ground. The work of the diplomats of the Kingdom of Serbia in the Ottoman Empire, primarily the consuls in Priština, at that time was related to listing Albanian crimes. The year after the conclusion of the Greek-Turkish peace was marked by anarchy that spread to the entire Kosovo *vilayet*. The Turks thought that the events caused by the Cretan issue would also affect other peoples in the country, especially the Serbs. That is why they saw in the Albanians, from whom they did not take away their weapons, a guarantee for the preservation of the Empire. Such an attitude and pandering to Albanian outlaws influenced the increase in the number of atrocities, but also, at the same time, the involvement of the Government in Belgrade, which appealed to the highest authorities of the Turkish government to prevent the extermination of the Serbian population. The further course of events and the autonomy of Crete in October 1898 further disturbed the Albanians who thought that a similar situation could happen in the Kosovo vilayet, so they started to organize themselves. At the beginning of 1899, the sultan announced that their weapons would be confiscated, so they organized a gathering in Peć and decided to fight for autonomy. The organization of the Albanians and the decisions made at the meeting, according to the consul of the Kingdom of Serbia, were directed against the Serbian population (Vojvodić 2007a: 266; Peruničić 1985: 321–336, 337).

The steps taken by the Government in Belgrade to improve the position of the Serbs and prevent further violence did not bring concrete results, so at the suggestion of Stojan Novaković, the so-called *Blue Book* was published, which represents correspondence between the Government, the Embassy in Constantinople and the Porte about the suffering of Serbs for the period from May 1898 to June 1899. In fact, this publication, printed in 1,000 copies, aimed to put the Serbian issue in the context of the international issue. However, at that moment, the European powers were not ready to discuss the issue of the suffering of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, as before when it was done for other peoples in the Ottoman Empire. The circumstances that arose in the relationship between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire influenced the decision from Belgrade that this book would not be the subject of discussion at the Hague Conference, which was also attended by delegates from Serbia (Vojvodić 2007a: 271–274).

Over time, the government in Belgrade saw that the atrocities against the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija not only did not stop, but also increased. That is why, from the beginning of 1899, it secretly sent weapons to Old Serbia. In that same year, two companies were sent from Serbia with the task of attacking thugs. The deterioration of the situation was influenced by various factors, such as the decline of the authority of the local government, the lack of money for current administrative needs, the growing dissatisfaction in the Turkish army and among government officials. The situation in which

the Ottoman Empire found itself made the Albanians the absolute masters of the situation in the entire Kosovo *vilayet*. The population in Priština, Peć and Novopazar *sandžak* was in the worst position, where there were frequent attacks on prominent Serbs, whose property was stolen. The representations of the Serbs sent to the Turkish authorities remained unsuccessful. Stories circulated among the Albanians about a secret agreement between the Balkan states in order to divide the European part of the Ottoman Empire. Using this and similar stories, they attacked again and again not only individually, but in waves, demolishing everything in front of them. Numerous schools and churches were hit, and the situation was also difficult on the Serbian-Turkish border.

The Turkish authorities were not ready to deal with the Albanians and punish them for the crimes committed. Encouraged by such a policy from Constantinople, they did not give up their intentions, so at the very beginning of the 20th century they decided to deal with the population of Ibarski Kolašin, which represented the most homogeneous environment, populated by Serbs. In that intention, they were supported by some Turkish officials, military commanders and religious elders. The Serbs of Ibarski Kolašin, faced with such plans of the Albanians, decided to arm themselves and offer resistance. At the suggestion of the consul from Priština, several rifles were delivered through the Raška customs office, which were issued to persons of trust. The government of the Kingdom of Serbia sent old rifles, confiscated from the Serbian-Turkish war. because, in case the Turkish authorities found out about the arming of the Serbs, it wanted to avoid responsibility. The Serbs began to slowly arm themselves and offer greater resistance to the Albanian oppressors. From time to time there were shootings that raised the suspicion of the Turkish authorities and the Albanians and prompted them to pay more attention, especially from the moment when rumors began to circulate about the secret transfer of weapons from Serbia. The Turkish authorities decided to send the army in the spring of 1901 with the aim of disarming the local population. A search was carried out in Kolašin, but without any results. Turkish officials probably already had some information about the transfer of weapons from Serbia, so they ordered the investigation to continue. That is why the army thoroughly searched the Sjenica and Novi Pazar area. This investigation caused great dissatisfaction among the Albanians who decided to take action themselves and raid the Serbs of Ibarski Kolašin. The investigation of weapons in the Kolašin villages in the summer of 1901 was followed by brutal crimes against Serbian villagers (Bataković 1990: 269–285).

The moves of the Albanians were followed with special attention by Austria-Hungary, which encouraged the action to carry out the massacre of the Serbs. It was in accordance with its planned policy, and the resulting situation would have benefited it in multiple ways. It had the aim of pointing to anarchy, provoking a reaction from the Kingdom of Serbia and thus creating doubt in friendly relations with the Porta.

Russian representatives in Constantinople and throughout the Ottoman Empire put pressure on the Turkish authorities and officials to improve



the situation on the ground, ensure the safety of the Serbs and punish the Albanian villains who participated in these events. Thanks to the efforts of the Russian and Serbian diplomacy, as well as the personal involvement of the consul from Skopje, Viktor Mashkov, and Semsi Pasha, the commander of the Mitrovica division, the massacre of the Serbian population in Ibarski Kolašin and Novi Pazar was avoided (Zarković 2008). The events in Ibarski Kolašin had a significant impact on the further course of events in the Ottoman Empire, primarily on the intervention of the great powers at the Porta and demands for the initiation of reform action in the European part of the Turkish state.

The Russian consul Mashkov reported the events in Kolašin and the suffering of the Serbs in detail to his embassy in Constantinople. Based on reports from the field, Russia was fully aware of the entire situation, which influenced the government in Petrograd to restart and intensify the implementation of the proclaimed reforms. Wanting to ease Russian pressure and prevent its intervention, Porta proclaimed a reform program for the Rumelian *vilayets* in November 1902 (Vojvodić 1988: 417–420; Martinović 1985: 60–65). It had formed a commission with the task of sorting out the situation in Kosovo, Bitola and Thessaloniki *vilayets*, which came to Skopje on December 12, 1902. The commission was headed by the former Armenian *valya* Husein Hilmi Pasha, whose actions were related to gendarmerie, tax and judicial reforms. The reform action, in accordance with the previously proclaimed equality, provided for the admission of a certain number of Christians to the gendarmerie, court and administration. Albanians, known for their opposition to the implementation of reforms, did not like this idea at all. Their leaders exerted various pressures on the Serbs, especially those who had already applied for work in the administration and gendarmerie. In addition to the already existing one, pressure was exerted by the ordinary Albanian population, as well as by members of the local authorities. The *begs* of Priština openly protested against the implementation of the reform action, joined by other Albanian leaders from other parts of the Kosovo *vilayet*. The Albanians did not only resent the Serbs, but also they reacted against the actions of the imperial army, which, by order of Hilma Pasha, had the task of dealing with outlaws in the Gnjilan, Peć and Prizren areas. The actions of Hilmi Pasha led to a conflict between the Albanians and the Turkish army, but also to the Albanian organization in January 1903 in Đakovica (Mikić 1988: 51). The meeting in Đakovica, caused by the reform action, represented a turning point in the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Albanians.

Hilmi Pasha unsuccessfully tried to appease the Albanians, who did not give up their demands. The Albanians from Metohija insisted on their demands, while those in Kosovo avoided entering into an open conflict with the imperial army. Disagreements between these two groups contributed to the failure of the rally in Đakovica, whose advocates called a new rally near Lučki Most, halfway between Đakovica and Peć. This meeting was more extensive than the previous one, but its importance was diminished due to the fact that the leaders were second-rate Albanian leaders. At the time of its holding, the most influential

Albanian leaders were in Skopje, at the invitation of the *vali*, whose appeals to calm the situation had little effect on the opponents of the reforms.

The actions of the army did not completely appease the Albanians, who later further continued to organize, hold meetings and commit crimes against Serbs. Their opposition to the reform action and conflicts resulted in the conquest of Vučitrn, the campaign on Mitrovica and the murder of the Russian consul (Sekulić 2005: 151–152). Albanian action in this part of the Kosovo *vilayet* seriously undermined the reputation of the Ottoman Empire and, at the same time, provoked Russia and other great powers to put pressure on the Porta to implement the proclaimed reforms. The actions of the great powers influenced the Porta to make a decision on the engagement of new detachments and the determination to deal with the Albanians. There were bloody conflicts between the two sides, which resulted in the pacification of the rebel regions, the arrest and prosecution of the initiators of the resistance, and the beginning of the introduction of reforms (Zarković 2013: 147).

The appeasement of the Albanians and the implementation of reforms lasted a short time because in the summer of 1903 an uprising broke out in Macedonia. Among the most interested in reforms were Russia and Austria-Hungary, whose emperors drew up a plan for further reforms in the fall of 1903, which contained provisions for: reorganizing the gendarmerie with the help of foreign officers, regrouping administrative units based on the principle of nationality, reorganizing administrative and judicial authorities with local self-governments, the restoration and compensation of devastated areas and the disbandment of reservists, volunteers and *bashibozuks*, as well as the control that will be carried out by civil agents of Russia and Austria-Hungary (Jagodić 2009: 78).

This plan led to the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and a greater influx of great powers, especially Austria-Hungary, which in later years would have a great influence on the Albanians, through whom they would strive to achieve their goals. Austro-Hungarian action influenced the implementation of reforms, the outcome of which was the exclusion of the northwestern part of the Kosovo *vilayet* from this project. These reforms were never implemented to the end, and the equalization of Christians and Muslims never took root. The Albanians considered the Serbs to be the main culprits, in which they had the undisguised support of Austria-Hungary, whose goal was to create even greater intolerance between the opposing parties. The various methods used by the representatives of the Dual Monarchy, as well as its numerous agents in the Kosovo *vilayet*, contributed to the creation of even greater anarchy. In that period, the Porta and the Sultan found themselves between the European powers as advocates of reforms and the Albanians as their opponents.

Serbia tried to, in accordance with its capabilities, improve its position and prevent the suffering of its compatriots in Old Serbia. However, as the violence against the Serbs continued to multiply, and diplomacy did not bring the expected results, other proposals appeared from the Serbian side to take certain steps to improve the position of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. There were many

reasons for this and for the rift in the relations between Serbs and Albanians. First of all, religious fanaticism has always been a strong obstacle to rapprochement with the Orthodox, then patriarchal habits, customs and traditions, the expulsion of Albanians from Serbia after 1878 and finally the pandering of the imperial authorities, making them the absolute masters of the situation.

Among the methods used by Serbia to protect the Serbian population in Old and Southern Serbia one could find the following:

- obtaining and bribing Albanians, especially in the villages in those regions where violence and cruelty were most pronounced;
- of the most dangerous Albanian chieftains and robbers by mutual murder;
- political agreement with the Albanians;
- extermination Hiring Albanians as guardians of Serbian villages;
- armament;
- mutual extermination of Albanians;
- formation and sending of companies from Serbia (Rakić 1985: 94–106).

Serbia set aside a certain amount of money to pay certain Albanians because it wanted to protect the most vulnerable villages, especially those that did not have any form of protection. Albanians in numerous villages, even the larger ones, caused damage, let cattle into the sown fields, stole and destroyed the harvest of Serbian peasants. The insecurity and uncertainty of the Serbian peasants influenced the idea of making the Albanians the guardians of the village (the *poljaks*). A *poljak* was paid in kind for his work, and each house gave 10–15 kilograms of wheat and barley per year. In addition, the guardians of the village had additional income that they collected from the perpetrators of the damage. Hiring Albanians for the post of *poljaks* initially brought good results, but over time that work was performed by bad people, villains and evil-doers, for whom the protection of the fields was the last priority. From protectors, they became a great burden for the village, which had to support and feed them throughout the year. However, they were not alone in that work because they mostly led a company with them, made up of idlers and robbers, whose demands the Serbian peasants had to fulfill. The thefts in the villages were, in a way, the work of *poljaks* who did not directly participate in them, but they induced the bandits to do so. The *poljaks* reported to the authorities about the events in the villages. They stayed and slept in Serbian houses and often transmitted infectious diseases, lice and scabies. Because of such behavior and unsanitary conditions, the Albanian *poljak* became a synonym for general danger in Serbian villages. His function was to some extent legalized and the Serbs did not know how to get rid of this form of protection. They managed to do that at the beginning of the 20th century, at a time when Sima Avramović was consul in Priština, who was present at an unpleasant event caused by the behavior of Tafa, a *poljak* from the village of Donja Gušterica. Tafa, with the help of his comrades, mistreated the peasants, ignoring the presence of the consul, and when asked what he was doing, he arrogantly and coldly answered „I am a *poljak*“. In this way, he wanted to make it clear that he was the absolute master

of the village and that he could go anywhere uninvited. Avramović's remark that *poljak* belongs in a field, not in a village, was followed by an ironic reply: „It is our adet (custom) that *poljak* guards the village, not the field, because the field is guarded by itself.“ This sentence reflected the true position of the *poljaks*, and at the same time, the Serbian peasants. At the consul's insistence, Tafa, a *poljak*, left the village with his friends, but soon returned and continued to mistreat the Serbs. Upon his arrival in Priština, Consul Avramović officially requested the abolition of Albanian *poljaks* in Serbian villages, first from the *mutasarif*, and then from the *vali* in Skopje and the Porta in Constantinople. Avramović's efforts were supported by Bishop Nićifor and the Embassy of the Kingdom of Serbia in Constantinople, and they sent demands of identical content to the Turkish authorities. The Turkish government considered the demands of Serbian diplomacy, as well as the Patriarchate, and decided that in Serbian villages, *poljak* must be a Serb. The decision was announced on Mitrovdan in 1902 (Popović 2007: 304–307). After its publication, in some Serbian villages one could find some Albanian *poljaks*, but the final result was that a great burden was lifted from the Serbian people.

The greed and unrestrainedness of the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija, in addition to the Serbian population, was also aimed at churches and monasteries. Certain wealthier monasteries were forced to seek protection, so they hired certain Albanian families to guard them. The guardians of the monasteries were called *vojvodas* and they guarded the monasteries of Dečane, Peć Patriarchate, Devič, Sokolica. In Drenica, a family with the surname Vojvoda, which it received thanks to its former occupation, survived until recent times. The Sokolica Monastery, near Mitrovica, was surrounded by notorious Albanian villages, but managed to be preserved thanks to the brothers Ahmet and Isa Ademović (Isa Boljetinac). Thanks to their protection, the visitors and guests of the monastery did not experience any major inconveniences, as evidenced by the words of consul Todor Stanković who visited this monastery at the beginning of the last decade of the 19th century in the company of Vladimir Karić and Mihail Ristić (Stanković 1910: 170).

One of the proposals, originating precisely from Consul Stanković, related to winning over certain Albanians and getting closer to them. Stanković was of the opinion that insufficient work had been done in this field, and he based his ideas on rapprochement on the experience of the field, gained during a tour of the area inhabited mainly by Albanians and contacts with some of their leaders. He established important contact with Sulejman aga in Vučitrn, a well-known protector of Serbs, then with Mustafa beg Džinić, the first member of the *medžlis*, and his nephew Ibrajım beg Džinić, also a member of the *medžlis*. By the way, both were considered sincere and loyal friends of the Serbs (Stanković 1910: 5–6). In addition to those mentioned, the consul also came into contact with other numerous Albanians on whom the fate of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija depended. He believed that ties with influential Albanians could be strengthened by giving various monetary rewards and gifts, and according to

his calculation, certain financial resources of around 1.500 dinars were needed for the realization of what he envisioned (Peruničić 1985: 304–305). Consul Stanković's efforts and actions did not yield the expected results, so Serbian diplomacy continued to search for a solution that would make life easier for Serbs under Turkish rule.

One of the numerous proposals that was considered to be able to contribute to the improvement of the position of the Serbian population in Old Serbia related to arming. Unlike Albanians and Turks who owned weapons, Serbs were denied that right. Despite this ban, some Serbs secretly had weapons that they obtained illegally. Such a position influenced the idea of arming the Serbs in Old Serbia in some Belgrade circles. The initiators were diplomats who served in Serbian representations and consulates in the Ottoman Empire. The development of this idea was encouraged by the work of Bulgarian committees that armed their population and supporters in Macedonia and members of the *exarchate*, due to which the Serbs found themselves on the defensive against the Turks and Albanians in Old Serbia, but also against the Bulgarians in Macedonia (Jovanović 1937: 271–307).

Ideas about arming the Serbian people, who, due to poverty, were not in a position to buy weapons like the Albanians, were especially common among Serbian politicians during the great persecutions against the Serbs. During the general reprisals of the Albanians in 1887, Serbia sent the army to the Vranje and Toplica districts, and Turkey accused it of transferring weapons to its own people, which served as a reason for large-scale searches (Vojvodić 2000a: 84). Aided by the Turks, the Albanians persisted in committing crimes against the innocent Serbian population. Albanian aspirations contributed to the Government in Belgrade increasingly considering the idea of arming the Serbs in Old Serbia. In 1898, Stojan Novaković developed a compromise plan that included arming, but also diplomatic pressure on the Porta. He noticed the actions of the Albanian tyrants and suggested that the Serbian people should be armed first, and then diplomatic pressure should be applied. It was his old plan from 1896, which predicted that the Serbs would arm themselves and in that way deter the Albanian villains who would then bypass those houses that they knew had male members and weapons (Jovanović 1921: 196).

The idea of arming was also advocated by the consul in Priština, Svetislav Simić, asking that it be implemented gradually. Since assuming the post of consul in early 1899, Simić saw the position of the Serbs in those regions, so he insisted on arming. In one of the numerous proposals addressed to the Government, he stated: „Left without the protection of the authorities, our people are instructed to defend themselves against Arbanas. But while all the Arbanas are armed, the Serbs, left with bare hands, are forced to bow their heads and receive blows without resistance, and are torn without a murmur. I have had at least a hundred cases where people, when I scolded them for not defending themselves, justified themselves by saying: 'How are we going to do it, sir, when we have nothing at our disposal. Get us rifles, and you'll see if they'll take

our heads off without replacing them“ (Bataković 1990: 274). In the conversation with some Serbs, various proposals could be heard, as well as risks that could put Serbia in an awkward position. It was considered that Serbia did not have enough money to send for the purchase of weapons, so it was proposed to distribute the old ones, left over from the Serbian-Turkish war of 1876-78 (Popović 2007: 168). Consul Simić sent this decision to the Government in Belgrade, but it hesitated to implement it for months, not wanting to cause an international conflict. At the end of June 1899, a session of the Propaganda Department of the Serbian government was held in Niš, which was attended, among others, by consuls from Priština, Bitola and Skopje. King Milan made the decision to start arming the Serbian people in Old Serbia (Jovanović 1941: 84). The government of Dr. Vladan Đorđević started delivering weapons in the spring, and that action continued the following year. During the action, there was a change of consul in Priština, and Simić's successor, Sima Avramović, objected to the way weapons were distributed and repeatedly warned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the dangers that threatened. In Belgrade, they did not respond to several warnings, but only after the dispatch of the Priština consul did they stop sending weapons without his knowledge (Zarković 2008: 39–41).

The idea of arming was initially related to the population in Old Serbia, and at first it was intended to keep weapons in the house for protection, and later to arm certain groups that would kill the biggest Serbian tyrants. No agreement was reached on this idea because some thought that such an action would cause a reaction that could be fatal for the Serbian people. That is why the opponents of armament proposed other methods to achieve the result. Among the most significant ideas were the following: 1) diplomatic action at the Porta and with the great powers, 2) peaceful policy towards Turkey, 3) bribing and paying certain Albanians who would protect certain villages and regions. The first idea was disturbed by the great powers that primarily looked at their own interests and did not take into account the real situation on the ground. An example of such action by the great powers is the Austro-Hungarian-Russian agreement from 1897, when it was agreed to dismember the Ottoman Empire and maintain the status quo (Vojvodić 2000: 49). In this kind of policy, the great powers helped their protégés, who ensured their influence on the ground, which is best evidenced by Austria-Hungary's relationship with the Albanians. The idea of peaceful relations between Serbia and Turkey was spoiled by the Albanians, but also by those who incited them to unrest and perform disobedience to the authorities, as well as the negligence of the authorities to restore order. The Albanians constantly committed crimes against the Serbs, even invaded the territory of Serbia, which could not leave the Government in Belgrade and the public indifferent. The third method, which concerned bribery and payment, was disrupted by the Albanians, but also by Austrian propaganda. Numerous cases have been recorded where the Albanians, despite the given promise and agreement, did not remain consistent. Such an attitude was influenced by their insatiability, and they constantly demanded a sum higher than the initial

amount, so protection often turned into supporting the „protector“. In addition, there were those who succumbed to Austrian propaganda, the content of which could be heard from the *hodjas* in the mosques. In such a situation, with the money that Austria could offer more than weak Serbia, the Serbian protectors switched to the Austrian side and turned into Serbian bloodsuckers (Zarković 2008: 35–36).

The beginning of the 20th century and the new adversities to which the Serbian population in Old and South Serbia was exposed not only from the Turks, but also from the Albanian and *exarchic* troops took on ever greater proportions. In Serbia, the position of the Serbian population under Turkish rule began to take precedence on the foreign policy front, and public opinion advocated the measure „an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth“. On the one hand, official Serbia used diplomatic means to seek the reorganization of the Turkish local administration, and on the other hand, it helped the Serbs to resist daily atrocities. This second, unofficial side of Serbian plans had a lot of support among official circles. They supported the actions of arming the Serbian population, which thus entered the phase of a favorable solution to the issue of Serbian defense in Turkey (Jovanović 1941: 142–143). A large number of soldiers, officers and other influential people from Serbia crossed secretly, armed, to Turkish territory, in order to protect their compatriots. In addition to the protection they provided, they simultaneously worked to strengthen self-confidence and spread the idea of liberation from Turkey and unification with Serbia (Ječmenić 1937: 316). In addition, the idea of creating a Serbian Chetnik organization began to appear in Serbia, the initiator of which was Dr. Milorad Gođevac, the chief physician of the Belgrade municipality. First, the Serbian Committee was formed, within which there were revolutionary, propaganda and financial sections. Representatives of the scientific and civic elite, respected representatives of the army, as well as the bearers of economic progress of that time in Serbia, took part in its work. Companies were formed that primarily had a defensive task. Their main goal was not to engage in conflict with the Turkish army and waste ammunition, but to stay on the ground as long as possible and organize Serbian villages for self-defense, both from Albanian and Bulgarian companies (Ilić 2006: 21, 23, 28). The Serbian Chetnik action led from 1903 until the Balkan Wars arose from the liberation aspirations of the Serbian people and at the same time represented the need for the unification of the Serbian ethnic space. The action was directly managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other ministries also participated indirectly: military, education and church affairs, finance and internal affairs. The operation of the companies contributed to the protection of the Serbian population in the Old and even more so in Southern Serbia, and the knowledge of the terrain by the Serbian Chetniks came to the fore in the battles during the First Balkan War.

At the end of the first decade of the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire fell deeper and deeper into crisis. The representatives of the Kingdom of Serbia who served in the Empire were aware of the situation that was tearing the country

apart. They carefully analyzed the resulting situation and informed the Government in Belgrade about it. Serbian consuls, representatives of the church, with the help of educational workers, worked more actively to organize their compatriots in the Ottoman Empire with the aim of uniting them. The events of the autumn of 1912 and the reforms in Old Serbia showed all the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and it became more visible that it was not possible to improve the position of the Serbian population. The Albanian rebellions in the years before the Balkan conflicts, as well as the uprisings in the spring and summer of 1912, influenced the decision of the Government in Belgrade to establish a connection with the Albanian insurgent leaders, whom they helped with money and weapons. The Serbian side found justification for this decision in the fact that the internal unrest in the Ottoman Empire weakened its ability to offer stronger resistance and restore order in the country, which was also important because of the upcoming conflicts in the Balkans (Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Serbia 1903–1914, Book V, Volume 1, 1984: 11).

#### SOURCES AND REFERENCES

- Bataković 1990: Dušan T. Bataković. „Istraga oružja u Ibarskom Kolašinu 1901. godine“. *Kosovsko–metohijski zbornik I*, Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 269–285.
- Bogdanović 1985: Dimitrije Bogdanović. *Knjiga o Kosovu*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti.
- Vojvodić 2007: Mihailo Vojvodić. „Konzularna konvencija između Srbije i Turske (1897–1896)“. *Izazovi srpske spoljne politike (1871–1918) ogledi i rasprave*. Beograd: Istorijski institut, 111–142.
- Vojvodić 2007a: Mihailo Vojvodić. „Plava knjiga' o stradanjima Srba u Staroj Srbiji“. *Izazovi srpske spoljne politike (1871–1918) ogledi i rasprave*. Beograd: Istorijski institut, 265–274.
- Vojvodić 2000: Mihailo Vojvodić. „Prilike na Kosovu i Metohiji i politika Srbije 1881–1912“. *Srbija i Balkansko pitanje (1875–1914)*. Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 43–73.
- Vojvodić 2000a: Mihailo Vojvodić. „Srbija i albansko pitanje krajem XIX veka“. *Srbija i Balkansko pitanje (1875–1914)*. Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 74–104.
- Vojvodić 1988: Mihailo Vojvodić. *Srbija u međunarodnim odnosima krajem XIX i početkom XX veka*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti.
- Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914*, knj. V, sv. 1, 1984: Ur. Radovan Samardžić: Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti.
- Zarković 2008: Vesna Zarković. *Afera u Ibarskom Kolašinu 1901–1902. godine*. Priština/Leposavić: Institut za srpsku kulturu.
- Zarković 2018: Vesna Zarković. „Izveštaji prvog konzula Srbije u Prištini Luke Marinkovića o situaciji u Staroj Srbiji“. *Hronotop Kosova i Metohije u nauci i umetnosti*. Leposavić: Institut za srpsku kulturu, 365–376.
- Zarković 2014: Vesna Zarković. „Kritsko pitanje i prilike u Kosovskom vilajetu“. *Baština*, sv. 37. Priština / Leposavić: Institut za srpsku kulturu, 123–135.
- Zarković 2015: Vesna Zarković. „Zbor Arbanasa u Peći 1899. godine i njegove posledice“. *Baština*, sv. 38. Priština / Leposavić: Institut za srpsku kulturu, 79–92.



- Zarković 2013: Vesna Zarković. „Reforme u Osmanskom carstvu i Stara Srbija u XIX i početkom XX veka“. *Baština*, sv. 35. Priština / Leposavić: Institut za srpsku kulturu, 135–152.
- Ilić 2006: Vladimir Ilić. *Srpska četnička akcija 1903–1912*. Beograd: IP Ecolibri.
- Istorija srpskog naroda VI/1*, 1983. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga.
- Jagodić 2009: Miloš Jagodić. *Srpsko–albanski odnosi u Kosovskom vilajetu (1878–1912)*. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike.
- Ječmenić 1937: Milan Ječmenić. „Rat 1912. godine za oslobodjenje Južne Srbije“. *Spomenica dvadesetpetogodišnjice oslobodjenja Južne Srbije 1912–1937*. Skoplje: Štamparija Južna Srbija, 309–325.
- Jovanović 1937: Aleksa Jovanović. „Četnički pokret u Južnoj Srbiji pod Turcima“. *Spomenica dvadesetpetogodišnjice oslobodjenja Južne Srbije 1912–1937*. Skoplje: Štamparija Južna Srbija, 271–307.
- Jovanović 1941: Jovan M. Jovanović. *Južna Srbija od kraja XVIII veka do oslobodjenja*. Beograd: Izdavačko i knjižarsko preduzeće Geca Kon.
- Jovanović 1921: Jovan M. Jovanović. „Novaković u diplomatiji“. *Spomenica Stojana Novakovića*. Beograd.
- Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji*. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga.
- Martinović 1985: Sreten Martinović. „Decembarski i Bečki program reformi u Turskoj 1902/1903. i stav Rusije prema Albancima“. *Obeležja*, god. XV, br. 3. Priština: NIRO Jedinstvo 57–75.
- Mikić 1988: Djordje Mikić. *Društvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba u XIX i početkom XX veka (od čifčijstva do bankarstva)*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti.
- Peruničić 1985: Branko Peruničić. *Pisma srpskih konzula iz Prištine 1890–1900*. Beograd: Narodna knjiga.
- Popović 2007: Janićije Popović. *Život Srba na Kosovu 1812–1912*. Gračanica: Nikanor.
- Rakić 1985: Milan Rakić. *Konzulska pisma 1905–1911*. Beograd: Prosveta.
- Sekulić 2005: Vesna Sekulić. „Otvaranje ruskog konzulata u Kosovskoj Mitrovici“. *Baština*, sv. 19. Priština / Leposavić: Institut za srpsku kulturu, 139–153.
- Srbija 1878. Dokumenti*. Priredili: M. Vojvodić, D. Živojinović, A. Mitrović, R. Samardžić. 198. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga.
- Stojančević 1998: Vladimir Stojančević. „Prvo oslobodjenje Kosova od strane srpske vojske u ratu 1877–1878. godine“. *Srpski narod u Staroj Srbiji u velikoj istočnoj krizi 1876–1878*. Beograd: Javno preduzeće Službeni list SRJ, Balkanološki institut SANU, 159–177.
- Stanković 1910: Todor P. Stanković. *Putne beleške po Staroj Srbiji 1871–1898*. Beograd: Štamparija Dj. Munca i M. Karića.

Весна С. ЗАРКОВИЋ

## СРПСКО ПИТАЊЕ У КОНТЕКСТУ СТРАДАЊА СРБА НА КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ КРАЈЕМ XIX И ПОЧЕТКОМ XX ВЕКА

### Резиме

Ослободилачки ратови 1876–1878. године донели су слободу Србији, али не и српском народу на Косову и Метохији и у Старој Србији уопште. Срби који су живели у Османском царству су, потакнути примером Србије, више од три деценије водили непрекидну борбу за ослобођење од туђинске власти. У тој борби полагали су велику наду у Србију, која је, како је време одмицало, све више јачала своје позиције. Као главни и основни задатак пред српским политичарима се наметнуло решавање питања положаја српског становништва ван граница Србије. Захваљујући искуству и раду својих дипломата, пре свега Стојана Новаковића, са Турском је била потписана конзуларна конвенција, на основу које је Србија добила право да отвара представништва на територији Царства. Крајем осамдесетих година отворени су први конзулати преко којих се српском становништву пружала помоћ и заштита. Притиснути свакодневним зулумима Арбанаса и не ангажовањем турских власти да исте спречи, Срби су били приморани да у великом броју напуштају своја имања и уточиште проналазе углавном на територији Србије.

Србија је настојала да преостало српско становништво заштити и код њих пробуди националну свест кроз ширење политичко–просветне пропаганде. У том циљу успела је да отвори већи број школа, ангажује кадар који се школовао у Србији, отвори књижаре и омогући слање књига. Такође, издвајала је новац за издржавање школа и цркава и водила борбу за признавање народности. Упоредо са тим, српске дипломате у европским престоницама су се трудили да информишу тамошњу јавност о тешком положају Срба у Старој Србији. У том циљу је за Прву хашку конференцију о миру припремљена тзв. *Плава књига* у којој се налазио списак почињених злочина над Србима у периоду 1897–1899. године. Краљевина Србија се трудила да са Османским царством одржава пријатељске односе, али када је постало више него очигледно да турске власти нису предузимале никакве мере да спрече арбанашка насиља, одлучила је да тајним каналима шаље оружје и упућује чете у јужне крајеве. Међу методама којима је Србија настојала да заштити српско становништво у Старој и Јужној Србији могле су се наћи: задобијање и поткупљивање Арбанаса, истребљење њихових најопаснијих вођа и разбојника, политички споразум са Арбанасима, ангажовање Арбанаса за чуваре српских села и њихово међусобно истребљење. Напори које је Влада Краљевине Србије улагала резултирали су ослобађањем и припајањем Косова и Метохије Србији.

*Кључне речи:* Срби, Албанци, Косови и Метохија, српско питање, насиља.

Петар Р. РИСТАНОВИЋ

# ИСТОРИЈА И/ИЛИ ПРОПАГАНДА: КЊИГЕ ТИМА ЏУДЕ, НОЕЛА МАЛКОЛМА И МИРАНДЕ ВИКЕРС О КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ

## Резиме

У раду је анализиран методолошки приступ и изворна утемељеност књига троје утицајних британских аутора чије су књиге о Косову и Метохији, написане у предвечерје рата 1999. године, имале снажан утицај на доносиоце политичких одлука са Запада. Наведеним књигама дефинисан је данас доминантни дискурс и наратив у западној академској заједници и публицистици. Утицај књига је и даље велики будући да се по правилу налазе на списковима литературе новијих научних радова и монографија. Такав далекосежни утицај наводи на потребу да се преиспита њихова методолошка и изворна утемељеност.

*Кључне речи:* Косово и Метохија, косовско питање, Тим Џуда, Ноел Малколм, Миранда Викерс.

CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији  
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

303.4(082)  
001.891(082)  
316.74:001(082)

INTERNATIONAL thematic scientific conference Fundamental  
Researches (2023 ; Leposavić)

International thematic proceedings Fundamental Researches  
/ [edited and prepared by Nedjo Danilovic, Dragan Tancic]. -  
Приштина [тј.] Лепосавић : Институт за српску културу =  
Pristina [i. e.] Leposavic : Institut for Serbian Culture = Belgrade :  
International Association of Social Science Methodologists, 2023  
(Piriot : Pi-press). - 624 str. : ilustr. ; 24 cm

"The holding of the international thematic scientific conference and the  
publication of this Proceedings were organizationally and financially  
supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological  
Development of the Republic of Serbia, Academy of Sciences and Arts  
of Serbian, Institute for Serbian Culture from Pristina - Leposavic and  
MB University from Belgrade." --> Kolofon. - Tekst na više jezika. - Tiraž  
150. - Begrüßungsrede des Akademikers Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Rohrbach,  
Mitglied der Europäischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste  
aus Salzburg: str. 9-10. - Str. 11-15: Foreword / Nedo Danilović, Dragan  
Tancić. - Str. 17-19: Introduction / Nedo Danilović. - Napomene i  
bibliografske reference uz tekst. - Bibliografija uz svaki rad. - Резимеи.

ISBN 978-86-89025-86-6

а) Наука -- Истраживања -- Зборници б) Методологија науке --  
Зборници

COBISS.SR-ID 122508297